## 1AC

### 1AC – Competitiveness

#### Contention one: Competitiveness

#### Dominant digital platforms gatekeep access to markets by both operating a platform and marketing their own goods on it. Only structural prohibitions prevent barriers to entries posed by companies’ structure, not just the scale of their market power.

Khan ’19 [Lina; Chairperson @ Federal Trade Commission, JD @ Yale Law School; “The Separations of Platforms and Commerce,” *Columbia Law Review* 119(4), p. 973-1098; AS]

A handful of digital platforms exert increasing control over key arteries of American commerce and communications. Structuring access to markets, these firms function as gatekeepers for billions of dollars in economic activity. By virtue of setting marketplace rules for the millions of merchants, producers, and developers dependent on their infrastructure, dominant platforms today “function as regulators.”3

As these platforms further concentrate market power, there are rising concerns about their size—usually in reference to the large share that each firm captures of its primary markets.4 Yet an equally important question concerns not the scale of these companies but their structure. One feature dominant digital platforms share is that they have integrated cross business lines such that they both operate a platform and market their own goods and services on it. This structure places dominant platforms in direct competition with some of the businesses that depend on them, creating a conflict of interest that platforms can exploit to further entrench their dominance, thwart competition, and stifle innovation.5 Consider Spotify’s effort to reach users through Apple’s iPhone while Apple sought to promote Apple Music. In 2016, Spotify revealed that Apple had blocked the streaming application from the App Store, “continu[ing] a troubling pattern of behavior by Apple to exclude and diminish the competitiveness of Spotify on iOS and as a rival to Apple Music.”6 Or take the challenge faced by Yelp, Foundem, and scores of online services to reach internet users while Google sought to build out its own competitor offerings.7

In Europe and India, competition authorities have found that Google ranks its own services higher than those offered by rivals, a “search bias” that means anyone competing with Google properties may effectively disappear from Google search results.8 Merchants that rely on Amazon to reach consumers are in a similar bind: Not only must they jostle for placement against Amazon’s own goods, but they also face the constant risk that Amazon will spot their bestselling items and produce them itself.9 Facebook, equipped with technology that lets it detect which rival apps are succeeding, would often give companies a choice: Be acquired by Facebook, or watch it roll out a direct replica.10 Competing with one of these giants on the giant’s own turf is rife with hazards.

Venture capitalists now factor this risk into their investment decisions.11 Indeed, the power of these gatekeeper platforms to steer the fate of countless other firms is described by entrepreneurs and investors as “having a profound impact on innovation in Silicon Valley”12 and “choking off the start-up world.”13 Venture capitalists now discuss a “kill-zone” around digital giants—“areas not worth operating or investing in, since defeat is guaranteed.”14 Discussing how tech platform giants today use their integrated structure to undermine rivals, a product manager who worked for Microsoft leading up to its antitrust suit observed, “It’s what we did at Microsoft.”15

Indeed, the way in which dominant online platforms threaten to undermine competition and distort markets today is not entirely new. At its core, the problem traces to a basic challenge posed by firms that capture control over a critical network or channel of distribution. Regulators and competition authorities have traditionally harnessed a set of tools to ensure that bottleneck facilities do not distort competition. These tools include common carriage, which requires firms to offer customers equal access on equal terms,16 as well as interoperability, which requires networks to maintain an open interface, enabling users to switch between platforms with ease.17 These policies respond, respectively, to problems of discrimination and lock-in.

In digital markets, however, third parties that depend on a platform risk not just discrimination and lock-in but also appropriation. Because dominant platforms monitor with unrivaled precision the business activity of third parties while also competing with them, a platform can harvest insights gleaned from a producer at the producer’s expense. This Article argues that these combined problems of discrimination and information appropriation invite recovering common carriage’s forgotten cousin: structural separations. Structural separations place clear limits on the lines of business in which a firm can engage. Rather than prohibit particular business practices, separations proscribe certain organizational structures. In antitrust, structural remedies are contrasted with behavioral ones: Whereas behavioral remedies seek to prevent firms from engaging in specific types of conduct, structural remedies seek to eliminate the incentives that would make that conduct possible or likely in the first place.18

Structural prohibitions have been a traditional element of American economic regulation. They have been applied as a standard regulatory tool and key antitrust remedy in network industries, often to prohibit a dominant intermediary from competing with the businesses that depend on it to get to market. While common carriage regimes prevent a firm from discriminating—requiring equal service on equal terms—structural prohibitions eliminate one source of the incentive to discriminate. In this way, common carriage and structural separations often functioned as complements in the service of nondiscrimination.

Today, structural separations have largely been abandoned.19 At the same time that lawmakers have significantly weakened or outright eliminated sector-specific regulatory regimes, judicial interpretation of antitrust law has drastically narrowed the forms of vertical conduct and structures that register as anticompetitive. And when antitrust enforcers have targeted these forms of conduct and structures in recent years, they’ve applied remedies that generally (1) fail to target the underlying source of the problem and (2) overwhelm the institutional capacities of the government actors assigned to oversee them.20 Neglecting structural separations results in both substantive harms and institutional misalignments—effects that are especially pronounced in digital markets.

#### Case-by-case adjudication creates slow and ambiguous enforcement of prohibitions on unfair business practices – regulatory uncertainty substantially disadvantages entrants.

Chopra & Khan ’20 [Rohit; Commissioner @ Federal Trade Commission; and Lina; Chairperson @ Federal Trade Commission, JD @ Yale Law School; “The Case for “Unfair Methods of Competition” Rulemaking,” *The University of Chicago Law Review* *87*(2), p. 357-380; AS]

Antitrust law today is developed exclusively through adjudication. In theory, this case-by-case approach facilitates nuanced and fact-specific analysis of liability and well-tailored remedies. But in practice, the reliance on case-by-case adjudication yields a system of enforcement that generates ambiguity, unduly drains resources from enforcers, and deprives individuals and firms of any real opportunity to democratically participate in the process. One reason that antitrust adjudication suffers from these shortcomings is that courts analyze most forms of conduct under the “rule of reason” standard. The “rule of reason” involves a broad and open-ended inquiry into the overall competitive effects of particular conduct and asks judges to weigh the circumstances to decide whether the practice at issue violates the antitrust laws. Balancing short-term losses against future predicted gains calls for “speculative, possibly labyrinthine, and unnecessary” analysis and appears to exceed the abilities of even the most capable institutional actors.1 Generalist judges struggle to identify anticompetitive behavior2 and to apply complex economic criteria in consistent ways.3 Indeed, judges themselves have criticized antitrust standards for being highly difficult to administer.4 And if a standard isn’t administrable, it won’t yield predictable results. The dearth of clear standards and rules in antitrust means that market actors face uncertainty and cannot internalize legal norms into their business decisions.5 Moreover, ambiguity deprives market participants and the public of notice about what the law is, thereby undermining due process—a fundamental principle in our legal system.6

Decades ago, former Commissioner Philip Elman observed that case-by-case adjudication “may simply be too slow and cumbersome to produce specific and clear standards adequate to the needs of businessmen, the private bar, and the government agencies.”7 Relying solely on case-by-case adjudication means that businesses and the public must attempt to extract legal rules from a patchwork of individual court opinions. Because antitrust plaintiffs bring cases in dozens of different courts with hundreds of different generalist judges and juries, simply understanding what the law is can involve piecing together disparate rulings founded on unique sets of facts. All too often, the resulting picture is unclear. This ambiguity is compounded when the Supreme Court assigns to lower courts the task of fleshing out how to structure and apply a standard, potentially delaying clarity and certainty for years or even decades.8

#### FTC rulemaking improves the speed, clarity and certainty of enforcement to level the playing field for market entrants.

Chopra & Khan ’20 [Rohit; Commissioner @ Federal Trade Commission; and Lina; Chairperson @ Federal Trade Commission, JD @ Yale Law School; “The Case for “Unfair Methods of Competition” Rulemaking,” *The University of Chicago Law Review* *87*(2), p. 357-380; AS]

“Rulemaking” often evokes the idea of government imposing some inflexible prescription upon the marketplace. This is not what we are suggesting. As former Commissioner Elman rightly noted, rulemaking can also be related to “standards, guidelines, pointers, criteria, or presumptions.”41 Rules come from courts, legislative bodies, and agencies. While they were not promulgated as agency rules, certain elements of the merger guidelines eventually came to serve as rules once courts adopted them.42 The merger guidelines stipulate the analytical framework that the agencies rely on to enforce the merger law. Agency rulemaking could do the same for “unfair methods of competition.”

We see three major benefits to the FTC engaging in rulemaking under “unfair methods of competition,” even if the conduct could be condemned under other aspects of antitrust laws. As we describe above, the current approach generates ambiguity, is unduly burdensome, and suffers from a democratic participation deficit. Rulemaking can benefit the marketplace and the public on all of these fronts.

First, rulemaking would enable the Commission to issue clear rules to give market participants sufficient notice about what the law is, helping ensure that enforcement is predictable.43 The APA requires agencies engaging in rulemaking to provide the public with adequate notice of a proposed rule. The notice must include the substance of the rule, the legal authority under which the agency has proposed the rule, and the date the rule will come into effect.44 An agency must publish the final rule in the Federal Register at least thirty days before the rule becomes effective.45

These procedural requirements promote clear rules and provide clear notice. As the Supreme Court has stated, a “fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.”46 Clear rules also help deliver consistent enforcement and predictable results. Reducing ambiguity about what the law is will enable market participants to channel their resources and behavior more productively and will allow market entrants and entrepreneurs to compete on more of a level playing field.

#### There are no neatly bounded ways to capture all dimensions platform power – expanding rulemaking authority for an expert agency allows separations regimes to match market realities.

Khan ’19 [Lina; Chairperson @ Federal Trade Commission, JD @ Yale Law School; “The Separations of Platforms and Commerce,” *Columbia Law Review* 119(4), p. 973-1098; AS]

D. Application: Challenges and Unresolved Questions

Implementing a separations regime presents some first-order questions and challenges. First, how do we define platforms and to which platforms should a separation apply? Second, how does one identify the parameters of the platform, especially when integration provides heightened functionality? Third, what should be the scope of the prohibited activity and how should the prohibition be structured? And fourth, what is the proper institutional mechanism for implementing the separation? This section offers some initial suggestions for how to approach these questions. Arriving at a complete analytical framework for structuring separations in digital markets will require deeper engagement with these issues.

1. Defining Platform. — Offering a clearly bounded definition of “platform” is challenging. Most definitions look to the role that the entity plays in intermediating activity by others. One definition, for example, is “a firm that controls a network, facility, or essential input that those providing a complementary good or service” must “rely on.”635 Another set of definitions focuses on the infrastructure-like role that these firms play, by structuring access to markets or facilitating transactions.636 And some discussions use the terms “network,” “infrastructure,” and “platform” interchangeably.637

Recent studies by policymakers have also settled on the idea that dominant platforms play a unique role that regulators should recognize. In March, the Digital Competition Expert Panel—a panel convened by the U.K. government to study digital markets—issued a report proposing, among other ideas, that dominant platforms that enjoy a “powerful negotiating position” be designated as having a “strategic market status” and be required to abide by a special code of conduct.638 A report commissioned by the European Commission, meanwhile, noted that, by designing marketplace rules that govern millions of users, dominant platforms “function as regulators” that should face a special responsibility to “ensure a level playing field” on their marketplace and “not use [their] rule-setting power to determine the outcome of competition.”639 Given the challenge of offering a bounded definition of “dominant platform,” any definition will likely be under- or over-inclusive. But any definition should seek to capture the degree of market power that the platform enjoys over users.640 How essential is the platform’s infrastructure? To what degree do other businesses depend on the platform to reach users, and what is the cost to businesses of avoiding this platform and using alternative channels? Relevant factors could include: (1) the extent to which the entity serves as a central exchange or marketplace for the transaction of goods and services, including the level of market power that it enjoys in its platform market; (2) the extent to which the entity is essential for downstream productive uses, and whether downstream users have access to viable substitutes for the entity’s services; (3) the extent to which the entity derives value from network effects, and the type of network effects at play; (4) the extent to which the entity serves as infrastructure for customizable applications by independent parties; and (5) the size, scope, scale, and interconnection of the company.

There are no neatly bounded ways to capture these dimensions of platform power. When implementing “maximum separation,” the FCC initially used operating revenue as the criterion for determining which carriers must comply.641 In the context of digital platforms, market share may prove a better proxy than operating revenues, given that it is the platform’s role as a gatekeeper or bottleneck—for which there are no real adequate substitutes—that gives rise to the relevant harms.

The prohibition should be centered on the activities that the platform facilitates as a bottleneck. Since a key goal of the separations regime is to eliminate the conflict of interest that arises when a dominant platform directly competes with the firms using the platform,642 only activity that would place platforms in direct competition in this way would be subject to the prohibition. This would not prevent platforms from integrating into lines of business that do not rely on the platform market. Nor would such a separations regime target conglomeration or vertical integration categorically; it would instead focus on platform entry into markets that creates the ability and incentive to discriminate, to leverage dominance, and to use information collected on firms as customers against them as competitors.

2. Distinguishing Between Platform and Commerce. — Applying separations to digital platforms would likely raise the challenge of identifying what constitute distinct products or services. In Microsoft, for example, the court had to determine whether the operating system and the browser—the two products the government claimed Microsoft had “tied”—should be considered a single integrated system.643 Microsoft argued that bundling new functionality into old products was a basic component of technological evolution.644 A similar issue may arise with digital platforms: Android, for example, could claim that certain apps must be integrated with its operating system in order to provide basic functionality or for technical necessity.

The traditional metric for assessing whether a set of bundled products constitute separate products is consumer demand. In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit relied on Jefferson Parish’s consumer-demand test to determine whether consumers preferred a choice in browsers.645 Applying a similar inquiry in the platform context could similarly help identify whether integration of distinct functionalities should be viewed as an integrated system or as a platform. Regulators would also have the capacity to determine, over time, whether certain apps or features were necessary for basic functionality and whether the benefits of integration were sufficiently high to offset any potential harms to innovation. There may also be specific apps or functionalities where innovation is less likely to be transformative, and therefore where integration may prove fewer risks. As with earlier regimes, periodic reassessment and revisions would prove necessary to ensure the separation continued to accord with and reflect evolving market realities.

3. Institutional Mechanism and Timing. — A separations regime separating platforms and commerce could be implemented through statute or rulemaking or as antitrust remedies (under existing or new antitrust law). A statute from Congress could also establish the principle of separating platforms from commerce—as was the case with banking— with the specific authority to design and implement separations delegated to an agency. This approach would benefit from having an expert agency design and revisit the separation. Absent new legislation, the FTC could use its Section 5 authority to implement a separations principle through rulemaking.646 Designing separations only through rulemaking would require the agency to create rules of general applicability and— absent a specific congressional mandate—could limit the agency’s ability to structure highly tailored separations. Antitrust remedies would be costlier and take significantly longer, requiring the government or a private party to successfully show anticompetitive conduct and effects stemming from a digital platform’s involvement in multiple markets.

Given the enfeebling of antitrust doctrines that police single-firm anticompetitive conduct—and the judicial requirement that remedies be carefully tailored to competitive harm—this path is likely to be significantly more challenging.647 Previous instances of structural separations offer a few models for structuring these prohibitions. An operational or functional separation requires the firm to create separate divisions within the firm, requiring that a platform wishing to engage in commerce may do so only through a separate and independent affiliate, which the platform may not favor in any manner. A full structural separation, by contrast, requires that the platform activity and commercial activity be undertaken through separate corporations with distinct ownership and management. For example, the functional approach would permit Alphabet to operate Google search and vertical services that produce content so long as the two complementary services are structured as separate affiliates. The second option would prohibit Alphabet from running both the platform service and the complementary service, requiring that one be spun off and run by an independent owner.

It’s not clear that anything short of a full structural separation would be sufficient, especially given the risks of information misappropriation. While running complementary services as affiliates could be accompanied by information firewalls, the efficacy of firewalls requires close monitoring.648 Evidence shows that the antitrust agencies have neglected to fully monitor and enforce conduct remedies in the past.649 Moreover, firewalls may prove especially difficult to monitor in the context of digital platforms, given the heightened information asymmetries between private platform firms and public enforcers. It is possible that the risk of information misappropriation may vary by platform—but dominant platforms should carry the burden of establishing why operating complementary services as affiliates would not be anticompetitive.

Finally, a basic challenge facing regulators and enforcers when dealing with high-tech industries is the role of timing. Because these markets can evolve quickly, market changes can render regulatory interventions obsolete.650 Similarly, the failure to intervene can leave exclusionary conduct unchecked, resulting in path-dependent reductions in innovation. Any subsequent attempt to impose separations should include a built-in review process every two to three years, to ensure that the remedy still matches the market conditions.65

#### Competition leads to innovation that maintains the US’s technological edge – consolidation removes incentives for it and suppresses smaller innovators.

Sitaraman ’20 [Ganesh; Co-founder and Director of Policy @ Great Democracy Initiative; Professor of Law @ Vanderbilt University; “The National Security Case for Breaking Up Big Tech,” *Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia*; AS]

Big Tech, Competitiveness, and Innovation

One of the central arguments against breaking up and regulating big tech on national security grounds is that big tech companies are essential for innovation in the tech sector and thus for American competitiveness and ultimately for national security. Historically, however, innovation has come from a mix of competition and public funding of research and development. Breaking up and regulating tech companies thus doesn’t mean ceding ground to the Chinese on technological innovation—it means creating a competitive marketplace with great innovative capacity.

Whether or not they say it explicitly, those who want to protect big tech from antitrust and regulation support a national champions model. The national champions approach suggests that innovation takes place within big companies that are protected from competition and therefore have resources to spend on research and development. Some associate this approach with Joseph Schumpeter, who suggested that firms in competitive markets might be less innovative than monopolists.58 In this vein, commentators celebrate how Bell Labs was able to innovate for generations and see Google X, Facebook, and other tech companies as similarly investing in frontier research that will ultimately lead to innovative breakthroughs.59

While innovation can take place under a national champions model, innovation does not require national champions—and there are strong arguments that the national champions approach is limited and even counterproductive. First, as Tim Wu has noted, “[B]oth history and basic economics suggest we do much better trusting that fierce competition at home yields stronger industries overall.”60 This response, of course, has been commonplace in basic economics for decades and in debates on competition is linked to the views of Kenneth Arrow.61 Market competition is good for innovation because competitors have to find ways to differentiate themselves in order to survive and expand. In contrast, large protected firms get lethargic, are slow to innovate, and rest on their laurels.

Wu points out that we also have evidence—not just theory—to show that protecting national champions is inferior to encouraging competition. In the 1980s, Wu argues, Japan took the approach of protecting its national champions in the electronics industry. Powerhouses like NEC, Panasonic, and Toshiba had direct government support. In contrast, the United States took the opposite tack with IBM. The computer firm was brought under antitrust scrutiny, and the legal battle went on for more than a decade, along the way chilling Big Blue from engaging in any conduct that could even potentially run afoul of the antitrust laws. The result, Wu notes, was to create the space for a variety of hardware and software companies, Microsoft, Lotus, and Apple among them. Competition led to innovation and the creation of some of the most forward-looking companies of the era.62

Second, national champions can actually limit innovation because they have an incentive to avoid research and innovations that might jeopardize their business model or undermine their dominant position. Bell Labs, for example, has long been celebrated for its role as an “ideas factory.”63 But Bell and AT&T also suppressed innovations when they threatened its business model. Bell inventors, for example, developed recording devices in the 1930s that could have been used for answering machines. But AT&T’s management blocked their emergence for fear that they would jeopardize use of the telephone.64

An alternative approach to innovation is one that relies less on protectionism for national champions and more on market competition and on public investment in research and innovation. Competition, as noted already, can be a powerful motivator for innovation. When big tech incumbents face little competition, society forgoes the innovation benefits that come from competition. Who knows if Instagram or WhatsApp could have dethroned Facebook’s primacy and developed even more new and innovative products? Facebook’s moves to acquire those firms prevented us from ever finding out. What small businesses might emerge if they didn’t have to compete with Amazon Basics on Amazon’s Marketplace? Unwinding mergers and separating platforms from companies that do business on the platform would help spur competition and lead to innovation.

Some might argue that robotics, AI, and quantum computing are so resource-intensive that an ecosystem of smaller companies engaged in fierce competition would mean that no company would have the resources available to invest in those next-generation technologies. There are a few responses to this argument. First, it is not clear that breaking up and regulating big tech would prevent those firms from having the considerable resources to develop the technologies of the future. Facebook would still have billions of users, even without Instagram and WhatsApp, for example. Amazon’s platform would still have enormous market power.

#### Independently, dominant platforms fuel Chinese digital authoritarianism – dependencies on Chinese firms furthers their military technologies.

Sitaraman ’20 [Ganesh; Co-founder and Director of Policy @ Great Democracy Initiative; Professor of Law @ Vanderbilt University; “The National Security Case for Breaking Up Big Tech,” *Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia*; AS]

BIG TECH, GLOBAL ENTANGLEMENTS, AND GREAT POWER COMPETITION

At a time of resurgent great power competition, claims that big tech companies are assisting that competition are superficially appealing, but they largely do not hold up to scrutiny. Many of the biggest tech companies are global players, operating in China, working with that government (knowingly or unknowingly), and seeking to expand their footprint. This not only means that their work abroad assists technological development in China but also that the Chinese government has increased leverage over those companies and the United States. Breaking up these companies would create a domestic technological ecosystem in which a more significant part of the marketplace is not dependent on Chinese markets, thereby making the United States more resilient.

How Big Tech Helps Strengthen China

The claim that big American tech companies are somehow an alternative to Chinese dominance—or, in the more extreme form, that they are competing with China on behalf of the United States—is largely backwards. In fact, many big American tech companies are operating in China, working with Chinese companies, and seeking to expand. Because markets and the state are intertwined in China, interactions with Chinese companies and investments in China are likely to pass along operational and technological developments to the Chinese government and military, including in ways that advance its emerging surveillance state—and accelerate its ability to spread its model of digital authoritarianism around the world. In short, big tech companies that operate in China are likely assisting the rise of China, not acting as a hedge against it.

Rather than competing with China, many big tech companies are integrating with China or attempting to deepen their integration with China. Google has announced an AI center in Beijing,8 and it is exploring a partnership with Tencent that involves using the Chinese tech giant’s cloud service as an alternative to Google Cloud.9 In 2018, the company also proposed Project Dragonfly, which would have created a search engine that would be in compliance with Chinese censorship regulations behind the Great Firewall.10 That endeavor created controversy within the firm and criticism from human rights groups.11

Other companies also operate in China or are seeking to do so. Microsoft is expanding data centers in China and has built an operating system, “Windows 10 China Government Edition,” for the Chinese government.12 After Alibaba, Amazon provides the largest cloud service in China, and its Amazon Web Services division works with local companies and is expanding its data centers.13 Apple, of course, famously designs its phones in California but makes them in China.14 In 2017, Apple announced a partnership with a Chinese firm with close ties to the government and a year later moved its Chinese iCloud and iCloud encryption services to China.15 Notably, Facebook isn’t operating in China—but not for lack of trying. The company has repeatedly attempted to gain access but has been blocked by government officials.16

Merely operating in China might not seem like it undermines the claim of U.S.-Chinese competition. After all, it might be that American companies are seeking to steal market share from Chinese companies in China. Global dominance requires, unsurprisingly, dominance around the globe, including in the world’s biggest markets. The problem is that, according to scholars, U.S. government officials, and even American business associations, any U.S. company that is developing AI in China, making significant technological investments in China, or simply operating in China is likely supporting the Chinese government and military.

Chinese companies are often state-run, partly owned by the state, or have informal ties to state and Communist Party officials, as scholars have documented.17 Formal and informal ties allow the government to have influence over many companies, and they create an incentive for companies to comply with party preferences preemptively even without formal government pressure.18 Cooperation and partnerships with these companies therefore mean cooperation with state-directed aims. “No major Chinese company,” Senator Mark Warner has noted, “is independent of the Chinese government and Communist Party.”19 An official at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce goes even further, arguing that American firms going to China have “to please the Chinese government and the Communist Party.”20

Moreover, because artificial intelligence is a dual-use technology, ostensibly commercial innovations can also have military implications. China’s stated doctrine of “civil-military fusion” thus virtually guarantees that companies are indirectly assisting the military if they are working with Chinese entities.21 Under that doctrine, “any technologies held by the private or academic sectors—whether imported or developed in-house—must be shared with the Chinese military.”22 When combined with the corporate-state relationship in China, this means the technological innovations in the private sector are likely being shared with the government for military purposes. As former defense secretary Ash Carter has noted, “If you’re working in China, you don’t know whether you’re working on a project for the military or not.”23

The fact that Chinese companies and the state are intertwined means that American companies working in China are potentially helping accelerate the adoption of digital authoritarianism within China and its spread abroad. In general, the development of artificial intelligence “offers a plausible way for big, economically advanced countries to make their citizens rich while maintaining control over them.”24 Big data, combined with AI, enables governments and big tech companies not only to predict but also to shape what individuals will do.l Politically, this means that governments will have the power to preempt dissenters to a far greater degree than authoritarian regimes of the past.25 Economically, it means that centralized economic planning might find greater success than in the past, because governments and companies can shape the behavior of individuals.26 And over time, behavioral changes shape beliefs, potentially building support for the regime itself.27 These dynamics suggest that the new “digital authoritarianism” may have greater staying power than its low-tech precursors.28

At home, China has long been concerned about domestic disharmony and has pursued a policy of “social management” to achieve “holistic” security—not just national security but party organization and the management of the social order.29 The Chinese State Council sees AI as “irreplaceable” in ensuring social harmony in the future.30 China has taken steps to develop a “social credit system,” in which individuals are assessed in every interaction to determine their trustworthiness, their compliance with laws and social norms, and the degree to which their social networks are also compliant. Chinese tech companies have reportedly agreed to share data with the government in support of this project.31 Local governments and tech companies are cooperating to develop “credit cities,” the local counterpart to a full-on national system.32 Chinese companies are also already exporting surveillance technologies abroad, including biometric censors and facial recognition software.33

Given that many big American tech companies are operating in China or seeking to do so and that engagement with Chinese entities likely means information is transferred to the government, the idea that big American tech companies are helping the United States vis-à-vis China in some kind of Cold War-style technology arms race makes little sense. It is just as likely, if not much more so, that firms operating in China are directly or indirectly furthering China’s emergent domestic surveillance capabilities, its military use of those technologies, and its spread of digital authoritarianism abroad as well.34

#### Adopting a separations regime for dominant platforms is key – a competitive ecosystem prevents dependence on Chinese markets.

Sitaraman ’20 [Ganesh; Co-founder and Director of Policy @ Great Democracy Initiative; Professor of Law @ Vanderbilt University; “The National Security Case for Breaking Up Big Tech,” *Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia*; AS]

How Breaking Up Big Tech Builds a More Resilient Economy and Democracy

What does bigness have to do with integration? Or to put it differently, is the real problem integration with China rather than a weak antitrust and regulatory regime to govern big tech companies? The question of integration with China as a general matter is beyond the scope of this essay, but the size and dominance of American tech companies is part of the problem, and breaking up big tech should therefore be part of the solution.

To see why, compare a concentrated ecosystem with a small number of big companies to a competitive ecosystem with a large number of small companies. In a concentrated ecosystem with few players, China will have far more leverage over the United States. A small number of big tech companies that are integrated with China will be more dependent on Chinese markets for consumers and profits—and, in turn, more vulnerable to pressure from the Chinese government. In contrast, in a fractured market with many players, it is much more likely that some will seek other sources for supply chains, develop domestic American capacities, or simply choose not to engage in the Chinese market—whether because of idiosyncratic preferences, competitive dynamics, product differentiation, higher costs, or other factors.

It is theoretically possible that we might instead expect another out come: A small number of tech firms making monopoly profits might not need Chinese markets and therefore would be more independent from that country’s fusion of politics and economics. Likewise, a multi-player ecosystem of smaller companies, each with razor-thin profit margins, might push all of these players to dependence on Chinese markets for consumers and profits (this is, of course, where debates over integration versus disentanglement are relevant). But theory is not reality, and this alternative hypothesis has not been borne out. In our current highly concentrated tech market, big tech companies are not forsaking Chinese markets out of a combination of morality, patriotism, and monopoly profits. They are operating in China and are desperate to integrate further.

Concerns about censorship and distorted practices are also significantly reduced in a competitive ecosystem of smaller players because some companies and creative gatekeepers won’t aim to comply with Chinese government preferences. Consider the Hollywood context. Disney’s share of box office sales domestically, for example, approaches 40 percent, and the six biggest studios have 85 percent of box office sales.53 These companies produce fewer films and, because of their market power, can contractually require that those films be shown in theaters in ways that block other films.54 These companies are also increasingly integrating vertically across production and distribution: Netflix both produces shows and operates a streaming service, as does Amazon and now even Disney. The result is that smaller players are likely to face a tilted playing field because integrated behemoths can prioritize their own content over competitors and might not take chances on content that isn’t likely to maximize their viewership goals.55 If these big integrated companies comply with Chinese censors because of their ambitions in the Chinese market, then American consumers will not see content that doesn’t adhere to Chinese government preferences. In contrast, in a system with a large number of small studios, many would not have the size and scope to play to the Chinese market, let alone be dependent on the Chinese market. They also wouldn’t have the power and scale to preference their own content over competitors through vertical integration. The result would be an ecosystem in which Americans will have a range of content choices—including entertainment that might not accord with the views of foreign censors.

Big tech companies are not likely immune from what is happening in Hollywood—as well as what has happened to Mercedes and other entities that seek to operate in China. Many of these companies, like Amazon and Google, seek access to Chinese markets and operate as both content producers and distributors or platforms. To the extent that they have divisions whose work is objectionable to censors in foreign countries (Amazon, of course, creates its own content; as does YouTube, which is a subsidiary of Google), they too will feel pressure to preemptively shape that content in ways that are palatable to censors. And because of their market power within the United States, U.S. consumers are likely to be left with fewer and fewer serious scalable alternatives.

#### Chinese tech supremacy causes nuclear war.

Kroenig ’18 [Matthew; 11/12/18; Deputy Director for Strategy @ Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service @ Georgetown University; “Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?”; https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war/]

Recently, analysts have argued that emerging technologies with military applications may undermine nuclear stability (see here, here, and here), but the logic of these arguments is debatable and overlooks a more straightforward reason why new technology might cause nuclear conflict: by upending the existing balance of power among nuclear-armed states. This latter concern is more probable and dangerous and demands an immediate policy response.

For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons. In situations of mutually assured destruction (MAD), neither side has an incentive to start a conflict because doing so will only result in its own annihilation. The key to this model of deterrence is the maintenance of secure second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack.

Recently analysts have begun to worry, however, that new strategic military technologies may make it possible for a state to conduct a successful first strike on an enemy. For example, Chinese colleagues have complained to me in Track II dialogues that the United States may decide to launch a sophisticated cyberattack against Chinese nuclear command and control, essentially turning off China’s nuclear forces. Then, Washington will follow up with a massive strike with conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles to destroy China’s nuclear weapons. Finally, if any Chinese forces happen to survive, the United States can simply mop up China’s ragged retaliatory strike with advanced missile defenses. China will be disarmed and US nuclear weapons will still be sitting on the shelf, untouched.

If the United States, or any other state acquires such a first-strike capability, then the logic of MAD would be undermined. Washington may be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike. Or China may choose instead to use its nuclear weapons early in a conflict before they can be wiped out—the so-called “use ‘em or lose ‘em” problem.

According to this logic, therefore, the appropriate policy response would be to ban outright or control any new weapon systems that might threaten second-strike capabilities.

This way of thinking about new technology and stability, however, is open to question. Would any US president truly decide to launch a massive, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack because he or she thought s/he could get away with it? And why does it make sense for the country in the inferior position, in this case China, to intentionally start a nuclear war that it will almost certainly lose? More important, this conceptualization of how new technology affects stability is too narrow, focused exclusively on how new military technologies might be used against nuclear forces directly.

Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict.

International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage.

You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power.

For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine.

Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.”

If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war.

If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member.

Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation.

This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly.

When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states.

These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington losing the race for technological superiority to its autocratic challengers just might mean nuclear Armageddon.

### 1AC – Plan

#### The United States federal government should adopt the principle of separating platforms from commerce for platforms in the private sector.

### 1AC – Dependency Trap

#### Contention two: Dependency Trap

#### Digital platform conglomeration generates a dependency trap that threatens inclusive growth – separating platforms from commerce protects small firms in the developing world.

Krauspof ’21 [Patrick et al; Professor for Competition Law and Head of the Center for Competition Law and Compliance @ ZHAW School of Management and Law (Switzerland); “Competition and Consumer Protection Policies”; The United Nations; <https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditccplp2021d2_en_0.pdf>; AS]

Making markets more inclusive not only addresses social imperatives, but also can make markets more competitive and benefit consumers. Most economists see a large and vibrant small business sector as essential in providing dynamism, growth and employment opportunities to an economy. Digital start-ups play the same role, especially in terms of dynamism through innovation. Consumer benefits may manifest themselves in lower prices, but equally important are the benefits from greater choice, and better privacy protection and innovation. Indeed, the open banking initiative in the United Kingdom has seen the most benefits from increased innovation by challengers but also the incumbents that have been forced to innovate more with their own data, which is now also accessible to challengers.

However, there is a distinct risk that the digital age could threaten this inclusion in two ways. First, there is a risk that digital markets are dominated by developed economy global giants exploiting the vast economies of scale and scope that exist. Second, there is also a risk that digital markets become dominated by a few large digital conglomerate firms even if they are domestically owned.

Conglomeration is a clear trend in digital markets, with larger digital platforms rapidly moving into adjacent markets, including producing or providing the products sold on their platforms. This is in stark contrast with the most recent trend of the industrial age, which is to focus on core competencies and abandon conglomeration which was often punished by investors. Various factors are driving this trend. One is the economies of scope associated with data gathered or consumers accessing those platforms, which can then be monetized in various ways. Rather than exchanging this data, firms have sought to exploit it themselves. Amazon’s move from online retailing of books to all other products, including its own brands, is a classic case. A second is the enormous resources at their disposal. For example, Amazon invested early in data centres to support the development of its e-commerce activities but then later decided to enter the market for cloud services (through Amazon Web services).44 The third way that inclusion 44 Bourreau M and de Streel A. (2019). Digital Conglomerates and EU Competition Policy. CRIDS Namur Digital Institute. can be undermined is that the control of consumer access enables platforms to displace those that depend on it. Amazon and Google shopping are examples for commercial goods, but Facebook and Apple do the same with apps.45 Finally, the observation of global trends indicate that digital conglomerates are much more likely to acquire start-ups than be challenged by them.46 Conglomeration is not only a global platform phenomenon. The same economic forces can support local conglomeration. South Africa has its own Internet giant, Naspers, which built its position through acquiring shares in Chinese social networking and gaming firm Tencent early on. Naspers has been building its local e-commerce and digital online platforms, in part through a series of acquisitions. It has also been expanding the product range of such platforms. Furthermore, the gradual expansion of the highly successful South African healthcare insurer Discovery into life insurance, short-term insurance and now banking is a more “old economy” example of how such data and consumer access can be leveraged into adjacent markets.

Conglomeration by global and local digital market firms has the potential to negatively impact inclusion, even if there is sufficient competition among these larger players to maintain price and non-price market outcomes at competitive levels. This is particularly concerning in the South African context, where market concentration levels are already high, and the likely impact of increased conglomeration are heightened barriers to entry for potential entrants since the large digital platforms become “gatekeepers” to access markets.

Therefore, from a competition policy perspective, more needs to be done to ensure that digital markets are also open to domestic start-ups and challengers, and that global firms share in the rewards that they derive from developing markets. Locally, additional tools will be required to address the threat of conglomeration. For example, merger control needs to be revisited not only for killer acquisitions, which have attracted most attention, but also to combat increased conglomeration through merger creep. Such acquisitions do not necessarily kill a potential competitor, but rather gives the conglomerate platform a foothold in an adjacent market that can be leveraged later.47

Merger control also needs to be alert to the removal of a potential entrant of another sort. In a developing country context, there is also a tendency for global platforms to acquire the largest local home-grown platform rather than enter themselves. Such mergers deny consumers the benefit of additional competition and a potentially less concentrated market in the future. In addition, taking a tougher stance on conglomerate strategies, such as self-preferencing, exclusive and most favoured nation agreements, may also be appropriate. In its draft buyer-power enforcement guidelines48 the CCSA has already highlighted that behaviour such as self-preferencing would be considered as unfair trading practice by dominant online platforms that bring together thirdparty suppliers and consumers, such as e-commerce platforms.

Developing domestic firms to compete in this space is another area for competition and even industrial policy. Online businesses can sell products globally without a physical presence in the countries they service. Such global reach and costless replication mean that the previous drivers of localized production are frequently left out. For instance, transport costs for raw materials, import tariffs or domestic distribution all provided a rationale for a local presence. That rationale may be missing in many (but not all) future digital markets. As a result, the driving force of innovation and back-end jobs created by these firms may remain in their headquartered country, leading to even greater exclusion of developing countries. Furthermore, global platforms may choose to shift their profits to low-tax jurisdictions – a strategy not necessarily viable for local platforms – that provide these global firms with a significant competitive advantage over local platforms.

If this is to be avoided, then developing countries will need to provide industrial policy incentives for global firms to station operations in their jurisdictions. It will also need to support the development of local digital firms to participate in the digital age, much like the infant industry arguments of old times. It will also require investment in skills and capital financing. This must include the funding of research through universities and will require regulators such as the CCSA to invest in-house talent focused on digitalization of the economy.

Policymakers and regulators in developing countries must also focus their efforts on how to support entrepreneurs to unleash these opportunities and deconcentrate markets. Doing so would directly address the twin objectives of competition policy, namely, more competitive and more inclusive markets. This support may be best achieved through proactively unblocking whatever hindrances remain for these digital entrants, particularly from incumbent firms. Ownership of data and access to consumers or distributional channels are market features that favour large firms purely by dint of their size and incumbency, rather than guaranteed superior product offerings.

3. Data portability and interoperability

Data is seen as a source of significant advantage in the digital age. Data is also the basis for many new and old services. While data portability and interoperability are at the heart of loosening the ~~FAAGs’~~ [GAFA’s] gatekeeper power, there is also tremendous scope for a general regime on data portability and interoperability to open markets to new innovative businesses, while ensuring privacy and security of personal data. Such a regime may be an effective tool in addressing the market power of existing “brick and mortar” incumbents by reducing barriers to entry, allowing new entrants to disrupt traditional industry and have an impact across all markets. Data is not the only area. The European Union expert report’s findings on digital markets around strategies to frustrate new entry deployed by digital firms also resonate to a large extent with existing old economy platforms such as financial service Consideration needs to be given to whether such rule changes should have broader application in markets where incumbents fight digital disruptors. Another benefit of a proactive approach is that it may well prevent emerging digital markets from becoming concentrated and less inclusive over time. A potential advantage of developing countries is that some of these digital markets are not as well developed, or there is still scope for new entry and market growth as a large part of the population is not yet connected. This means that there is still space to keep these markets competitive and not have the difficult task of either regulating entrenched monopolists or seeking to develop entrants in their presence. After all, if there is one lesson for competition policy from the ~~FAAGs’~~ [GAFA’s] debate, it is that it is extremely hard to address economic power once it is in place, especially for a competition regulator in a developing country.

The European Union expert report on digital markets has suggested a shift in onus for dominant digital firms on certain conduct.50 However, a developing country competition regulator should also consider whether there are additional rules which could be imposed even on non-dominant digital firms to ensure competitive markets in the future. For example, rules on data interoperability, limitations on most favoured nation or best price clauses, and limits to self-preferencing on digital platforms more generally could be imposed in competition law enforcement regardless of dominance. Limiting large platforms from selling in competition with those that access consumers through them might be another area for consideration.51

#### The United States must apply structural separations to platforms competing with commerce internationally – the Global South overwhelmingly lacks the institutional capacity to police platforms on their own.

Gurumurthy ’19 [Anita et al; Executive Director of IfTC and Expert Advisor for the UN Secretary General; “PLATFORM PLANET DEVELOPMENT IN THE INTELLIGENCE ECONOMY”; <https://itforchange.net/platformpolitics/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Platform-Planet-Development-in-the-Intelligence-Economy_ITfC_2019.pdf>; AS]

Platform governance: the way forward

Platform governance is an overarching development policy challenge of our times, not just a narrow technology policy issue. A planetwide restructuring of economic ecosystems by digital platforms has triggered new contestations over socio-structural relations and geopolitical power. This calls for a cohesive policy response that can adequately and appropriately reorient the platform mode of economic organization towards a more equitable distribution of the efficiencies of intelligence scale economies. Such a policy approach also needs to be multi-scalar (spanning interventions at global to national and local levels) as well as cross-sectoral (encompassing integrated actions in digital, economic and social policy domains). We summarize the challenges for policy development in this chapter, also discussing the key building blocks of a comprehensive policy framework.

4.1 Governance challenges in the platform economy

a) Old laws don’t work: Most countries in the Global South lack legislative frameworks that address the rights and development implications of platformization trends. For example, as we found, individuals engaged in platform-mediated service work across different sectors – domestic work in the Philippines, tourism in Indonesia, and transportation in South Africa – are not covered under pre-existing labor laws (Barrameda et al., 2019; Bentley & Maharika, 2019; Mare et al., 2019). Similarly, the interests of small and medium enterprises and consumers are not adequately protected against unfair trade practices of platform companies in emerging digital commerce markets such as Nigeria (Nuruddeen et al., 2018). Even developed countries with legal-institutional frameworks for human rights enforcement and corporate accountability – such as EU member states – face difficulties in coping with the ongoing digital disruption. In France and Belgium, robust pre-digital labor laws are proving inadequate in providing social protection to platform workers with atypical employment contracts. Similarly, the application of preexisting consumer protection frameworks to digital services in the EU has meant the use of blanket disclaimer clauses by platform firms, with no explanations about obligations arising in the online context (Delronge et al., 2019). When new legislation specific to the digital context, such as the GDPR, has been introduced, the penalties for violation may often not be deterrent enough (Hintz & Brand, 2019). It has been found that companies such as Google, which have been repeatedly fined by the European Commission for non-compliance with prevailing legislation, nonchalantly continue their illegal market practices by treating fines as the costs of doing business.

b) State responses are knee-jerk: Platform regulation often times tends to be ‘scandal-prompted’. For example, in China, it was public outrage over the rape and murder of two female passengers by DiDi Hitch drivers in 2018 that prompted the ministry of transport to set up a national supervision platform for systematic background verification of the drivers enrolled with ride-hailing companies (Chen et al., 2019). Similarly, in Uruguay, the central bank rushed in to hastily regulate the P2P lending sector without fully understanding its operational dynamics as a response to increasing negative national media coverage about the sector becoming a ‘financial Uber’ (Aguirre & GarciaRivadulla, 2019).

c) Platforms become boundary objects, interpreted differently by different state agencies: The conflicting imperatives to create an enabling environment for the growth of the domestic digital sector whilst guarding against the monopolistic and exclusionary tendencies of the platform economy seem to culminate in a Catch-22 scenario impeding effective policy development. For example, in Argentina, there was a bitter tug-of-war between the Ministry of Production and the Argentine revenue service (AFIP) about the application of tax laws to the regional e-commerce platform MercadoLibre. While the Ministry of Production called for exempting the platform from tax liability as part of its larger strategy of encouraging domestic digital industry, the AFIP was of the opinion that MercadoLibre ought to be treated as a commercial firm rather than as a technology company. The Ministry of Production had its way, but it is difficult to ascertain whether the decision to treat MercadoLibre as a technology company deserving of tax exemptions will fare better for the long term health of the Argentinian economy in comparison to the AFIP proposal (Artopoulos, 2019).

d) Big platforms are mythified as the necessary route to success: The myth-making that surrounds platforms also means that governments, especially in the Global South, adopt pro-platform policy approaches. The promise of innovation and opportunity has often led governments to valorize platforms as an enabling force in aiding national growth. There has existed in the tech industry, even before the platform era, an “alliance capitalism” between industries of innovation and policy (Higgins, 2015, as cited in Chen et al., 2019). Consider the 2018 bid by Amazon for its new headquarters, which had city and state governments in the US outdoing one another to offer sops, tax cuts, economic incentives and even political positions to the company, convinced by the potential for jobs and economic growth that Amazon could bring in for the economy (City Lab, 2018b). Or, as in China’s case, where the Internet Plus vision has catalyzed and championed the growth of private platforms in many ways (Chen et al., 2019).

e) Platform companies tend to usurp public policy spaces: By becoming a part of the multi-stakeholder processes that drive policy, platforms take on a direct role in norm and rule development. Such formal membership in governance spaces raises concerns about conflict of interest. In Argentina, when traditional banks raised concerns over MercadoLibre’s new offerings for fintech services, the company successfully negotiated with the government to set up a commission to liaison between the central bank and itself, also managing to get a seat on the commission (Artopoulos, 2019). In December 2018, Netflix’s director of regulation was appointed to Brazil’s film board, Conselho Superior de Cinema, a recognition that the platform is an increasingly important player in the country’s media regulation discussions (Valente & Luciano, 2019).

f) The lack of binding international law gives corporations runaway power: There is no binding global legal framework to check corporate abuse and violation of human rights. Transnational digital companies not only flout domestic legislation with impunity, but also exploit the lack of cross-jurisdictional rules. When faced with the risk of prosecution for unfair market practices in national courts, they evade responsibility by transferring liability to their parent company outside the jurisdiction (Mare et al., 2019; Van Eck & Nemusimbori, 2018). For example, in 2017, the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union brought a case to the national Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) on how Uber’s arbitrary deactivation and termination of drivers enrolled on the platform constituted a violation of protections against unfair dismissal under the country’s existing labor laws. CCMA took up proceedings against Uber SA, the South African subsidiary of the global platform company, and ruled in favour of the plaintiffs. A year later, the company managed to get the ruling overturned in the Labor Court on the technicality that Uber SA was a mere recruitment and training agency for Uber BV based in the Netherlands, which provided the app and made payments to partner-drivers.

4.2. Curbing digital monopolies

The platform economy displays monopolistic tendencies that curtail economic innovation and deepen inequality; but by no means is this an inevitability (Mann & Iazzolino, 2019). Traditional legal approaches to managing the rights, relations and conduct of persons and businesses engaged in commerce demand a major overhaul in the digital context (See Figure 5). This pertains to both commercial laws and to new rules concerning techno-design.

4.2.1 Changes to commercial laws

a) Competition law: Current approaches in competition law tend to regard short term consumer pricing gains as an adequate indicator of vibrant market competition (Khan, 2019). Understandably, this signal becomes extremely misleading in emerging digital markets where dominant platform companies often pursue strategies of free/deep-discounted products and services with an eye on long term consolidation of the network-data advantage for market domination (Curbing Corporate Power Alliance, 2019). In this scenario, competition law must move away from a narrow, neoliberal consumer welfarist approach. Instead, it must adopt economic structuralism as a framework to address the undue advantage that digital platforms enjoy in their role as “unavoidable trading partners” in the multisided markets they control (Cremer et al., 2019). The unique vantage that platforms occupy enables them to engage in upstream and downstream price manipulation, which policy must be able to check. The opacity that surrounds such data-supported gaming by platform companies makes it difficult to identify and establish proof of willful anti-competitive conduct. The EU has attempted to address this through its February 2019 regulation for platform businesses. It has mandated a duty of transparency (to be effective by 2020) with regard to standard terms and conditions of service (including data practices and notice of changes in terms of services) on all platform intermediaries providing digital services. This covers search engines, e-commerce marketplaces, app stores, social media and even price comparison tools. In addition, it has provided user guarantees for a right to explanation pertaining to algorithmic ranking and prioritization of goods and services on platform marketplaces (European Commission Press Release, 2019).

#### Structural separations between platforms and commerce equalize international bargaining power – now is key to prevent feedback effects from locking in dependency.

Johannsen & Gonzalez ’21 [German; PhD Candidate and LLM @ Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; and Andrés; LLM and Chilean Competition Law Compliance Officer; “Digital Platforms & Economic Dependence in Chile Any Room for Competition Theories of Harm without Dominance?”; <https://law.haifa.ac.il/images/ASCOLA16/GJAG.pdf>; 15 June 2021; AS]

1. Platforms and economic dependence

As transactions —both economic and social— move to the Internet, the role of digital intermediary platforms (hereinafter "platforms") in the economy has increased as facilitators of interactions between the several economic agents (users, buyers, sellers, advertisers, suppliers, etc.). At a global level, some platforms have reached a large size, in some cases becoming part of digital conglomerates with a multinational presence, among which are the so-called TechGiants.7 In Chile, while there is a consolidated presence of platforms that base their business on exploiting the attention of users (e.g. social networks or video platforms), in other sectors platforms are in early stages of expansion8 (e.g. e-commerce in Chile9 ).

In their expansive or developing stage, the platforms seek to increase the amount of users who interact through them. In general terms, more users on one side of the platform, gives more value to the users of that side and/or the other sides (direct and indirect network effects). Already in the world-renowned US Microsoft case this effect was reported when it was pointed out that developers preferred writing applications for operating systems that had enough consumers, and consumers preferred operating systems that already had multiple applications, an effect that is recognized as a barrier to entry.10 Additionally, in the data economy, the more members, the more and better data, which allows for improved service/user experience (databased network effects).11 In other words, by acting as an intermediary, the platform captures revenue, but also internalizes positive externalities, adding value to its whole infrastructure. The positive feedback generated by network effects, in addition to economies of scale and scope, can lead to a platform reaching a size where, for its rivals, it is no longer profitable to compete.12 Once this tipping point is reached, it is easier for the platform to win the whole market.13 This economic rationale defines how and for what purpose platforms compete. On the other hand, the platforms' business models seek to create a long-term relationship with users and suppliers.14 In this regard, the platform can track those who participate in it (via personal accounts and devices) and extract data to create profiles, study preferences and predict behaviour.15 This generates efficiencies related to the personalization of services, which reduces the efforts to match supply and demand. The information obtained from the data analysis generates value that, added to the positive network externalities, increases switching cost for users and suppliers.16 Regarding users, switching costs could be lower if they interact through several platforms (multi-homing).17 However, many times this is not the case since users incur in convenience costs or the platform sets strategies to make muti-homing unlikely.

18 Regarding suppliers, switching costs also depend on whether they had to adapt their technology and business model to the platform’s requirements. 19 Increasing switching costs can make it unrealistic for a provider to switch platforms and still operate in an economically viable way.20 The result is an asymmetry of bargaining power to the detriment of those who depend on the platform. In other words, there is an economic dependence, asis known in comparative doctrine.21 The brick-and-mortar retail sector,22 several agro-industrial sectors,23 and in the context of digital platforms show different market structures leading to dependence. 24 Yet, in the latter, there are two major differences. On one hand, economic dependence can be a decisive factor in the winner-takes-all race. On the other hand, platforms can be placed in a strategic position, as the orchestrator of marketplaces where other players —most of them not rivals of the platform— are going to compete. Therefore, it is critical to understand to what extent economic dependence regarding a platform may affect the wellfunctioning of the market.

2. Dominant power and uneven bargaining power

Economic dependence accounts for an unequal distribution of bargaining power.25 This imbalance allows the holder of such power to exercise aggressive negotiation strategies both at the contractual level (e.g. tied sales, arbitrary interruption of trade relations) and extracontractual level (e.g. refusal to buy or sell), which end up imposing an excessive economic burden on the weaker party. In comparative law, this type of uneven bargaining power is often called superior bargaining position or relative market power26 (hereinafter, indistinctly, “bargaining power” or “relative power”). The exercise of relative market power can have, in turn, a feedback-loop effect, as it reinforces the existing situation of economic dependence.

Regarding digital platforms that provide services as a distribution channel, their strategic position as an intermediary and the size of suppliers who offer goods through it —many of which are small or medium businesses— allows them to be in a position of relative power visà-vis many suppliers. Under these circumstances, the platform can incur in various forms of abuses. The most obvious would be to increase unilaterally the commissions for transactions or enter into exclusivity contracts. A less obvious would be to use the information it obtains as intermediary to favour the marketing of its own branded products 27 or deny access to data that is relevant to users (e.g. about recommendations) and suppliers (e.g. about ranking).28 Not being able to access such data can increase the cost of switching platforms, as it makes data portability more difficult, which in turn may increase the degree of dependence.

While these commercial practices are a manifestation of economic and contractual freedom, in some cases they might be abusive as they could undermine good faith and/or fairness in commercial relationships. In other words, these normative foundations serve as a basis for establishing a boundary between practices with relative market power that are socially acceptable and those which are not. Both at a national and comparative law, the materialization of this dividing line is found mainly in the field of contract law and unfair commercial practices laws. 29

On the other hand, from the perspective of the market’s functioning, although imbalances of bargaining power are inherent in all markets —so much so that they are usually considered a sign of competition—, 30 the exercise of relative market power could, under certain circumstances, cause negative effects on the market structure. As such, a second normative foundation for limiting relative market power could be competition. 31

For instance, taking the commissions’ example, if the platform’s relative market power allows it to raise commissions only to certain suppliers, the resulting differentiated charges can lead to a downstream distortion of competition. 32 On the other hand, in the refusal to grant access to data example, while a vertical-bilateral approach would enable a claim for damages generated on those who cannot access their data, a horizontal-collective approach allows an analysis of whether there are artificial barriers that obstruct competition in the platform market. Moreover, the imposition of exclusive distribution clauses or other formulas that increases switching costs can cause the same effect. 33

Platforms have incentives to be the first to adopt this type of strategy, because by doing so they can take advantage in the winner-takes-all race. 34 In this context, one of the main questions is when these aggressive strategies should be regarded as anti-competitive. To this end, competition law usually resorts to the rule of dominance.35 Dominant power is a legal fiction that —based on economic parameters— distinguishes whether a firm has sufficient market power to behave with independence from competitors36 and/or customers37 on a constant basis. If so, their behaviour is scrutinised to assess whether it has an economic justification or, on the contrary, whether it was carried out to exclude competitors or exploit the market. Yet, in digital platform markets (and in the data economy in general) this rule faces several difficulties.38 First, since platforms have multiple sides, it is complex to understand the distribution of power among them.

39 Second, in the data economy it is complex to know what the true utility or value of a company's accumulated data is and how important it is to access this data for third parties to compete.40 On the other hand, the rule of dominance seems not able to handle all cases of economic dependence threatening competition. Indeed, according to the examples we saw, a third difficulty is that there could be a scenario of dependence distorting downstream or upstream competition (where the platform does not compete, or competes, but is not dominant). Finally, a fourth difficulty is that, even without dominance, a platform can make strategic use of dependence to reach a position of dominance that will later allow it to win the whole market.

#### Structural separations can reorient the coordinates of geo-economic power – smart economies need smarter regulations.

Gurumurthy et al. ’20 [Anita “Unskewing the Data Value Chain: A Policy Research Agenda for Equitable Platform Economies”; (September 1, 2020); Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3872492>; AS]

Development is about how developing countries can move out of highly competitive activities with low margins to higher value activities with higher knowledge premiums, a process that has been recognized as structural transformation (Mann & Iazzolino, 2019). Fuelled by digital intelligence, all sectors of the economy are today undergoing a rapid makeover; a transition that requires developing countries to ensure that their productivity gains and digital capabilities are in a virtuous cycle. However, the “intelligence premium” harvested by dominant platform-lead firms in global data value chains constitutes a barrier to entry, impairing the global competitiveness of developing countries (Gurumurthy et al., 2019). The private enclosures of data and digital intelligence unfairly cement the competitive advantage of rich countries in global data value chains and thwart the potential for structural transformation of developing countries. Hence, while the data paradigm presents an urgency for systemic coordination towards national digital industrialization, it also represents a highly contested faultline in global resource redistribution.

The development question for the digital economy then is this: how can the data value chain be unskewed for redistributive equity and inclusion?

This conundrum has been the topic of significant, even if nascent, debates. Both traditional and new age policy proposals are being put forth from various quarters: institutional reform proposals from multilateral agencies and regional political blocs such as OECD, policy review assessments initiated at the national level, and unconventional and radical solutions from progressive civil society networks and scholars.

The emerging proposals can broadly be divided into three main areas: reining in Big Tech power, carving out a new resource governance regime for data resources, and building intelligence infrastructure capabilities in the Global South. Admittedly, many of the ideas involved are fledgling and demand in-depth exploration and robust debate before they can coalesce into clear and effective policies. But the juggernaut of Big Tech impunity and a yawning democratic deficit in global/regional policies in critical areas like trade, taxation and capital flows demand bold and agile action that eschews incremental, status quoist measures. They call for a conceptual overhaul that accounts for the realpolitik of geo-economic power.

The following sections take stock of noteworthy policy proposals that have emerged in each of the three areas, examining them critically and posing priority directions for a research agenda11 that can answer the following questions:  How are current policy directions and emerging institutional mechanisms able to address questions of market fairness and economic equity in the digital economy?  How do emerging global policy frameworks on data and AI impact national development priorities and pathways?

Area 1. Reining in Big Tech power through traditional policy instruments

In mainstream policy discourses in the digital arena, there is increasing recognition that competition and taxation policy reform are urgently needed to effectively curb Big Tech power in global data value chains.

With respect to competition policy, there is mounting consensus that industrial era competition law frameworks need to be overhauled so that they are able to effectively address the anti-competitive risks of network-data effects in data value chains. In 2020, the European Commission for Competition announced an in-depth study aimed at the updation of its merger assessment rubrics to address the realities of asset light, data heavy platform business models of the digital age (Modrall, 2020). The United States House Judiciary Committee has just concluded an investigation into the structural separations to be effected in data value chains to ensure that corporations controlling essential platform infrastructures are not also competing with the businesses that transact goods and services on them, the urgently needed “separation of platforms and commerce” that legal scholar, Lina Khan, has flagged in her study of Amazon’s antitrust behavior (Khan, 2017; 2019). Such interventions to overhaul traditional competition laws are urgently needed in the Global South as well.12

Currently, the European Union is exploring a limited form of structural separation by prohibiting specialized data sharing services from deploying the data that they transact for other uses, in an attempt to establish boundaries between data intermediation and intelligence services layers. But as the proposed regulation in its current form does not extend to cloud service providers, content intermediaries, and data exchange platforms developed in the context of IoT, it can be argued that this regulatory solution does not go far enough.13

#### Applying extraterritorial remedies to dominant platforms in developing countries unlocks the benefits of the digital economy.

First ’21 [Harry; Professor of Trade Regulation @ NYU; “Digital Platforms and Competition Policy in Developing Countries”; <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3864953>; AS]

Despite these caveats, it would be unwise for agencies in developing countries to ignore innovation issues in competition law enforcement. Developing countries have particular policy concerns that may seem less important to developed countries. One major concern, of course, is economic development, for which innovation may be a critical driver, particularly if we view innovation in a less technology‐centric way. Another major concern is inclusive economic growth, making certain that the gains from markets are distributed more widely rather than less, particularly when it comes to groups that have faced discrimination or have not adequately participated in the economy. A third concern is sovereignty, to make sure that a developing economy is not dominated by outside economic interests. Competition enforcement that increases innovation, particularly through an emphasis on competitive rivalry in dynamic markets, offers the possibility of advancing all three goals.

II. Digital Platform Use in Developing Countries

A. An Overview

Digital platforms are in widespread use in developing countries. The major U.S. digital platforms tend to be ubiquitous—in South Africa, for example, nearly half of all Internet users use Facebook, YouTube, and WhatsApp39— but there are also more local platforms in developing countries that are of significant size.40

Digital platforms can be categorized in different ways. Most common is to categorize them by the type of service they offer; the proposed EU Digital Markets Act, for example, has eight categories of “core platform service,” such as search engines, social networks, and operating systems.41 This type of categorization is similar to product markets as analyzed under competition law. A more functional approach divides digital platforms into transaction platforms and innovation platforms.42 Transaction platforms are generally multi‐sided and “support exchanges between a number of different parties,” Amazon and Uber being good examples. Innovation platforms (sometimes called technology or engineering platforms) provide components that a firms in a sector can use in common for their interactions. Computer operating systems and technology standards are good examples of these platforms.43

Entrepreneurs in developing countries have generally not created innovation platforms.44 Rather, they have used platform technologies created elsewhere to offer products that are distributed digitally, mostly on a relatively localized basis, that is, within the home country of the entrepreneur. Platform technologies are thus tools for these enterprises, allowing them to create new products and distribute them more efficiently. Even if entrepreneurs in developing countries do not create the tools, however, their use of platform technologies can still be market‐creating or sustaining and thereby qualify as innovation that can drive economic growth.

As the following examples will show, whether platforms are successful depends on many factors beyond competition law enforcement. Indeed, at the moment, competition law violations may not as yet have emerged. The question, though, is whether competition policy can play a role in keeping digital platform tools accessible and digital product markets competitive.

B. Mapping Platform Use in Africa: Four Areas

1. Online retail sales

Online retail sale of physical products and services is developing in Africa, but slowly. In South Africa, for example, e‐commerce is estimated to have only approximately 1‐2 percent of total retail sales, in comparison to 18 percent in the UK, with customers generally being higher income earners mostly concentrated in metropolitan areas.45 Nevertheless, throughout Africa a wide range of products are sold through online retail platforms, including food, consumer electronics, fashion, and apparel.46

Retailers use platforms in three ways. First, traditional brick‐and‐mortar stores use internet sales as a complement to their sales in physical stores; this has given major retailers a strong presence in online retail selling.47 Second, some sellers have an online presence only, selling their products at retail on various digital platforms. The “most ubiquitous” digital enterprises in Africa are e‐commerce sites that present their products on Facebook.48 Third, Africa‐based platforms offer marketplace services for other retailers. Takealot in South Africa has become the largest online retail marketplace in South Africa, for example, with more traffic than international competitors such as Amazon or eBay.49 It has also begun integrating into offering its own exclusive brands in competition with other retailers on the platform, raising potential concerns for self‐preferencing.50

Online retail sellers in Africa, particularly small and medium business enterprises, face a set of challenges that make it difficult to compete successfully. Online advertising is critical for these enterprises, but the two main advertising channels are Facebook and Google, and their use is expensive and complex for smaller businesses.51 Most e‐ commerce payment transactions are made by credit card, but fees can be high, payments can be slow, and concern for fraud has been high.52 Delivery may require investments in expensive assets to assure delivery (trucks, motorcycles, warehouses), particularly if the postal service is unreliable.53 On the other hand, the expense of drop‐ shipping international packages, the unreliability of the postal service, the relatively small size and geographical isolation of many African countries can make it difficult for international platforms like Amazon to compete successfully with local e‐commerce sites.54

2. Value chains

Companies in Africa use digital platforms to participate in “value chains,” that is, as intermediate transactors in the production and sale of goods and services. The ultimate consumer in the chain may be located outside the country or inside. For many African countries, participation in global value chains has been seen as an important way to stimulate economic growth, particularly if small and medium size businesses are the beneficiaries of such participation.55

The extent to which digital platforms have increased such participation by African firms is unclear. A study of value chains in Kenya and Rwanda examined how tourism firms integrated with international tourism sites to provide booking availability and service information, but found that their participation was often limited by a lack of technical skills and by the platforms’ managerial requirements.56 A study of small‐scale fresh fruit and vegetable farmers in Tanzania and Kenya focused on the use of certain basic platform technologies (mobile phones, Internet, and Facebook) to access payment systems, get pricing and production information, and reach export markets. Such usage was actually rather small (only 11 percent of farmers surveyed). Although the use of cellphones was helpful to small farmers in many local markets, reaching export markets required use of the Internet more than the use of basic cellphones, a step that excluded farmers who lacked sophistication (technical and linguistic).57

The difficulties of establishing digital value chains is not just limited by access to technology. More tractably for competition law, existing market structures and entrenched competitors may stand in the way as well.

A good example is the effort to create an online tea auction market in Mombasa, Kenya. The Mombasa Tea Auction provides the link between East African tea processors and international buyers.58 Kenya is the world’s leading exporter of tea and tea is Kenya’s number one foreign exchange earner.59 Tea is transported from highland areas in Africa to storage warehouses in Mombasa, where it is subsequently auctioned. Two groups have been the main intermediaries between growers and buyers in this process—tea brokers and storage warehouses—and only tea brokers could negotiate with buyers in the auction. Sellers made payments to the auction and then collected the tea from the warehouses for export. About 95% of tea exported from Kenya was sold through the Mombasa Tea Auction.

Asian competitors had been using online auctions but the Mombasa Tea Auction was done in person. Recognizing the auction’s inefficiencies, in 2012 an effort was made by the East African Tea Trade Association (EATTA) to introduce an online auction system. EATTA has 200 members from 10 African countries (mostly in East Africa) and includes all groups in the industry (producers, buyers, brokers, warehouses, and packers). Intermediaries were most opposed to an online auction, particularly the brokers who were believed to have controlled the in‐person auction and feared disintermediation.60 Interestingly, the brokers also feared that buyers would find it easier to collude when they didn’t have to place bids in an open auction, perhaps a not misplaced worry given a later antitrust suit against EATTA for fixing brokers’ and warehouse owners’ fees in the tea auction.61

After a trial run of an online auction, the EATTA members voted against its continuation. Apparently the brokers were able to convince smaller producers, whose only link to these markets was through the brokers, that an online auction would harm the brokers and thereby harm them.62 It was not until 2019 that an online tea auction became operational.63

3. FinTech

Financial technology products (“fintech”) operate as multisided platforms connecting buyers and sellers of financial services using the internet, mobile devices, software technology, and/or cloud services.64 Fintech products can cover aspects of banking, digital currencies, insurance, lending, money transfers, and payments. Fintech products can be deeply disruptive of existing banking and financial services but they can also offer platform infrastructure for many businesses. As such, fintech products are widely used throughout Africa.

Probably the most widely‐lauded fintech product in Africa is M‐Pesa, the payments service that runs on mobile phones.65 M‐Pesa was launched in 2007 by Vodafone, the U.K.‐based telecom company, in partnership with two African mobile phone system operators, Safaricom in Kenya and Vodacom in Tanzania.66 M‐Pesa “allows users to deposit money into an account stored on their cell phones, to send balances using SMS technology to other users (including sellers of goods and services), and to redeem deposits for regular money.”67 There is no charge for depositing the cash with the mobile phone company; charges are deducted when “e‐float” or “e‐money” is sent to recipients or when cash is withdrawn.68

M‐Pesa spread quickly following its introduction, with 10,000 new registrations by the end of its first year; two years later there were 7.7 million M‐Pesa registered accounts.69 In its first ten years the service expanded to ten countries, including one in Eastern Europe. By that time 21 percent of all adults in Sub‐Saharan Africa had a mobile money account; 73 percent of the population of Kenya and more than 50 percent of the population of Uganda and Zimbabwe used mobile money.

For all of M‐Pesa’s important success, its growth has actually been fairly limited, as has been the growth of fintech firms generally, which “have been slow to penetrate other sectors and other countries.”70 M‐Pesa has been limited by the fact that it operates a low‐tech service, using basic cellphones and text technology but not relying on more advanced smartphones.71 Thus it has proved less attractive in countries like South Africa that already had more advanced smartphone use and a “much more advanced banking network” that was able to meet the needs that M‐Pesa met.72 M‐ Pesa’s technological limits also made it less attractive for integrating its mobile payments API into other software applications.73

Whether the slow diffusion of fintech in Africa is a result of technological impediments or competitor resistance is unclear. One author concludes that the “largest impediment to more rapid FinTech growth appears to be the electrical and communications infrastructure in many developing countries, which have only limited, unreliable access to broadband Internet connections and smartphone handsets.”74 There is little doubt that these infrastructure issues affect the ability of digital platforms to thrive in Africa, but it may also be the case that the powerful financial companies can create legal roadblocks to fintech entry as well as try to preempt that entry by offering products similar to what potentially disruptive fintech entrants are offering. Indeed, this may be the case in South Africa. As the South Africa Competition Commission points out, one approach is for incumbents to accommodate the competitive threat by partnering with the upstart fintech firm: “the Fintech firm commits to remain small, providing the incumbent with its offerings whilst being able to ride on the scale, distribution channels and licenses of the traditional bank.”75 Another possibility is for the incumbent to acquire the fintech firm outright. A third is for the incumbent firm to compete with the fintech’s offerings, potentially leading to anticompetitive actions such as denying the fintech firm needed access to infrastructure assets.76

4. Sharing platforms

Sharing platforms are used by a wide variety of businesses in Africa. The South Africa Competition Commission defines these platforms as offering “short‐term peer‐to‐ peer transactions to share the use of idle assets and services or to facilitate collaboration.”77 Sharing platforms include not only firms that allow owners of vehicles and accommodations to “share” them with users, but also allows the sharing of work spaces, money (loans), clothing, and free‐lance services.78

Sharing platforms is an area in which the major international companies face competition with local enterprises. In the ride‐hailing segment, for example, Uber’s entry into African markets triggered the spread of mobile mapping technology for collecting location data from mobile vehicles. This allowed local companies to develop their own products suited to the needs of customers in different cities and countries, “giving themselves an edge over foreign services.”79 In South Africa, for example, Taxi Live and Mr D Foods (both South African firms) compete with Uber for taxi ride‐hailing and food delivery; Afri Ride, a South African company, competes by allowing commuters or drivers to offer unoccupied seats on their trips.80 In Kenya Little Cab competed with Uber by accepting M‐Pesa payments.81

Even with the existence of local companies, international firms appear to be the major competitors in most of these sharing platform markets. In a survey of users in Nairobi, Little Cab, four years after its entry, was running a distant third to the international platforms, Uber and Bolt.82 A 2020 survey in South Africa showed that three of the fifteen most popular applications in South Africa were international ride‐sharing platforms; none of the platforms in the survey was South African or African.83

The competitive problems that firms in sharing platform markets face do not appear to be the result of the exercise of anticompetitive conduct by dominant firms. Of course, as in developed countries, these platform companies do face opposition from the traditional operators in the fields that the platforms challenge. In the ride‐sharing market, for example, the metered taxi industry has responded to Uber’s entry in ways that are similar to the responses in developed countries. Taxi drivers have tried to physically block Uber drivers;84 they have also tried to invoke government action to stop Uber from engaging in certain business practices.85 But they have also tried to meet the challenge with the more competitive response of developing their own apps to connect passengers to metered taxis.86

C. Conclusion

The mapping just presented of digital platform use in Africa is by no means complete. Digital platforms are being developed in many other areas. In agriculture, for example, Kenya‐based mobile apps have been launched to help farmers better manage crops such as cassava, maize, and potatoes.87 In health care, there is a long list of available apps: “Hello Doctor” provides free essential medical information in 10 African countries; FD Detector (developed by five teenage girls from Nigeria) detects fake drugs by using bar codes; mTrac allows health care workers in Uganda to submit weekly health data via SMS; Omomi provides women in Nigeria with maternal and child health information and connects them to doctors.88

Even though the overview is necessarily incomplete, the picture that does emerge shows that digital platforms do hold out the promise not just of extending traditional industries into new means of distribution. Digital technologies also hold out the promise of dealing with certain problems that are more acute in developing countries (although not absent in developed countries). Access to capital can be increased through fintech applications; business transactions can be facilitated if payment systems are more secure; small enterprises can reach markets more efficiently if digital platforms are available and open; health care information and data can be shared more easily where mobile applications are available. Many of these improvements are more incremental than fundamental, but they all lead to better market‐driven outcomes.

III. Lessons For Competition Policy For Digital Platforms

It is not surprising that even a brief survey of the adoption of digital platforms in Africa shows that their use is both important and spreading. To a large degree these platform technologies are tools for a variety of improvements in the production and distribution of old and new products. The ability to use these tools to create new offerings is an important aspect of innovation.

Developed countries now seem obsessed with the power of the major platforms over many aspects of our economy and life. Developing countries seem less obsessed but, in a significant way, more dependent. Mobile technology is a key tool for delivering new digital products, but this technology often comes with a hidden “tax” imposed by developed world patent holders that control the standards on which these devices (now smartphones) are based and set the fees for licensing those standards.89 Developed world competition law enforcers seem powerless to control this pricing power; we wouldn’t expect developing world enforcers to do better. This tax, however, may be more critical in economies where the incomes are lower and smartphone use more limited.

What about the power of the GAFA? Although the use of Google and Facebook products is clearly ubiquitous, Apple and Amazon seem less powerful. In particular, Amazon’s business model puts it at a disadvantage in many developing economies, where shipping costs, tariffs, and delivery systems give local online sellers an edge.

Facebook and Google, but especially Facebook, loom larger. Search is important for delivering advertising, but Facebook, combined with WhatsApp, is vital not only for digital advertising but for digital presence. Sellers have come to rely on Facebook for connecting to consumers and establishing a network of users with whom to communicate and from whom to get information and data. Entrepreneurs in the developing world have complained about Facebook and Google’s high advertising rates, but with Facebook the problem goes deeper. Should Facebook or WhatsApp change their terms of use in some way, there would be little that developing countries could do. If Australia is having trouble controlling Facebook, what would we expect from countries with fewer users and smaller economies?90

This means that the first lesson for competition policy toward digital platforms is actually aimed at developed countries. If antitrust authorities in the U.S. are successful in their litigation against Facebook and Google, at least some thought should be given to how the remedies sought will affect developing countries.91 Although consideration of extraterritorial effects is not part of the case against these companies, remedy is broader. Positive spillovers should be part of the governments’ calculus.

#### Global digital inequality tears at the seams of the international order.

Wong ’20 [Johnson; Graduate School of Public and International Affairs @ UOttowa; “Digital Divide: Geotechnology, Politics and the International System”; <https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/41017/1/WONG%2C%20Johnson%2020205.pdf>; AS]

Despite the power of institutions and the strength of international organizations to resolve conflicts, the digital divide brought on by technology, economic self-interest, and centuries of culture, will necessarily disrupt the existing international system. Even within Western liberal democratic countries, there continues to be significant systemic confrontations as long-running grievances remain unresolved, such as historical racial divisions, the surge in right-wing populism, and a growing inequality gap. Internationally, there is a shift in the character and ability of international institutions themselves to resolve disputes through existing mechanisms, such as the ABM treaty, the CFE treaty, and the INF treaty. These are a few examples of the breakdown of existing international constructs (Hall, 2019, 4). At the same time, China will continue to offer, in partnership with its Russian and other Eurasian allies, an alternative political model that will emphasize the values and qualities which are important to those societies: social stability, economic prosperity, and national strength. Zhao summarizes this argument “In the final analysis, there is a choice between a Confucius capitalist China that is trying to integrate with a socially and ecologically unsustainable planetary capitalist order and a renewed socialist China that is leading a post-capitalist and post-consumerist, sustainable developmental path as part and parcel of an alternative globalization” (Zhao, 2013, 27). The separation between capitalism and political liberalism is an intentional strategy meant to demonstrate that state governance can be effective without political change. The Chinese model will also emphasize regional strength while avoiding ideas about global tyranny so long as the US continues to be portrayed as an international bully and troublemaker that acts with impunity. On the character about the Internet itself, the seeds of doubt had already been made in various forums: “At the Forum of Independent Local and Regional Media in 2014, Putin labeled the Internet ‘a special CIA project’, adding that the United States wanted to retain their monopoly over it” (Budnitsky and Jia, 2018, 607). The digital divide will become another point of division to separate the global community this century, and as a means for authoritarians to consolidate power. While military conflict may be avoidable, cyberconflict and the use of hybrid warfare – involving careful coordination between state and non-state actors – may take place more often as state forces engage online in efforts to upset the new status quo. The benefits of technology, such as 5G and beyond, may also challenge trends and perspectives about values and culture on both sides as societies and the role of technology to support individual, corporate or state interests evolve.

#### Only the FTC can cooperate with foreign antitrust agencies to properly administer remedies.

Pachnou ’17 [Ms. Despina, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMMITTEE” https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-2010-present-other-international-competition-fora/et\_remedies\_united\_states.pdf]

5. The Agencies’ Cooperation with Foreign Jurisdictions on Remedies

18. Achieving effective remedies often entails cooperation with foreign jurisdictions. Such cooperation may allow the U.S. agencies to secure relief that sufficiently protects U.S. competition and consumers without applying the remedy to conduct or assets outside the United States. When an extraterritorial remedy is necessary to address harm or threatened harm to U.S. commerce and consumers, cooperation helps to minimize the risk of conflict with obligations of foreign laws or foreign remedial orders.35 Cooperation and coordination on remedies can be efficient for enforcers and the parties under investigation, especially given that over 130 jurisdictions have antitrust laws and over 80 require pre-merger notification. Cooperation may result in a remedies package that addresses competition concerns in multiple jurisdictions.36 The Agencies work closely with competition enforcers in other jurisdictions on cases under common review, including to help foster convergence and consistent remedy determinations.37

6. U.S. Case Examples

19. To the extent that the Agencies rely on extraterritorial remedies, they do so in both merger and conduct cases, although they arise most frequently in the merger context. In all cases, the Agencies seek remedies that are appropriately tailored and that do not apply extraterritorially unless necessary to address the harm or threatened harm to U.S. commerce or consumers.

6.1. Merger Cases

20. In most mergers, the Agencies can obtain an effective remedy for U.S. competition and consumers without extraterritorial divestitures or other relief. This is the case even when an Agency coordinates with other jurisdictions in investigating a transaction that raises concerns in both domestic markets and markets outside the U.S. Even in these instances, however, coordination between jurisdictions can be helpful. For example, the FTC benefited from coordinating with antitrust authorities in Canada, the EU, and Mexico during the investigation of Emerson Electric Co.’s acquisition of Pentair plc, even though the potential harm to U.S. markets was resolved exclusively through the divestiture of a U.S. switchbox facility.38 Similarly, in the General Electric-Alstom SA merger, effective relief for U.S. markets required divestiture of only U.S. based assets; however, coordination between the Department and the EC in connection with the Department’s investigation “facilitated [the Department’s] investigation and helped formulate remedies that [preserved] competition in the United States and internationally.”39 A coordinated remedy resulted in the Department and the EC announcing separate settlements that eliminated harm to consumers in their respective jurisdictions. 40 There are many more cases in which the Agencies have coordinated with their foreign counterparts on mergers that affect multiple jurisdictions.41

21. Although a merger may affect competition in several jurisdictions, the Agencies focus on preserving competition in the domestic markets that may be harmed by the proposed acquisition. On some occasions, relief secured by foreign jurisdictions means that no remedy, domestic or extraterritorial, is necessary to protect domestic competition. Though our experience in deferring to another authority’s remedy is limited, we have relied on informal deference and remain interested in doing so, under the right conditions. A notable example was in connection with Cisco’s acquisition of Tandberg in 2010. The Department declined to challenge the merger in part due to certain commitments that Cisco made to the European Commission (EC) to facilitate interoperability in products related to a type of videoconferencing called telepresence. Waivers of confidentiality by the parties and industry participants allowed the Department and the EC to cooperate closely in their parallel reviews of the transaction, resulting in an efficient outcome for the enforcers and the merging parties.42

22. Nevertheless, certain merger investigations resolved by consent decree have required the divestiture of assets located outside the United States to preserve competition within the United States. For example, the FTC consent decree resolving concerns regarding the merger of cement manufacturers Holcim Ltd. and Lafarge SA required, in part, divestiture of a Canadian cement plant and related U.S. terminals along with two Canadian terminals related to a U.S. cement plant. The FTC explained that the divested assets “remedy competitive concerns in northern U.S. markets [and are] part of a larger group of Holcim assets located in Canada that Holcim and Lafarge have agreed to divest to address competitive concerns raised by the [Canadian Competition Bureau (“CCB”)]. Commission staff worked closely with staff from the CCB to reach outcomes that benefit consumers in the United States.”

43 An extraterritorial remedy was also required to resolve Department’s investigation of the Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV & Grupo Modelo S.A.B. merger. The consent decree in that matter similarly required divestiture of a facility outside of the United States, the Grupo Modelo brewery in Mexico, and a perpetual and exclusive U.S. trademark license to the seven brands of beer that Modelo then offered in the United States, as well as three brands not yet offered in the United States, but currently sold by Modelo in Mexico. This remedy allowed the acquirer “to meet current and future demand for Modelo Brand Beer in the United States,” which resolved concerns that the merger would harm competition in twenty-six local U.S. markets.

#### Extinction from nuclear war, warming, and next gen tech.

Harari ’18 [Yuval Noah; Professor of History @ Hebrew University of Jerusalem; “We need a post-liberal order now”; The Economist, https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/09/26/we-need-a-post-liberal-order-now]

For several generations, the world has been governed by what today we call “the global liberal order”. Behind these lofty words is the idea that all humans share some core experiences, values and interests, and that no human group is inherently superior to all others. Cooperation is therefore more sensible than conflict. All humans should work together to protect their common values and advance their common interests. And the best way to foster such cooperation is to ease the movement of ideas, goods, money and people across the globe. Though the global liberal order has many faults and problems, it has proved superior to all alternatives. The liberal world of the early 21st century is more prosperous, healthy and peaceful than ever before. For the first time in human history, starvation kills fewer people than obesity; plagues kill fewer people than old age; and violence kills fewer people than accidents. When I was six months old I didn’t die in an epidemic, thanks to medicines discovered by foreign scientists in distant lands. When I was three I didn’t starve to death, thanks to wheat grown by foreign farmers thousands of kilometers away. And when I was eleven I wasn’t obliterated in a nuclear war, thanks to agreements signed by foreign leaders on the other side of the planet. If you think we should go back to some pre-liberal golden age, please name the year in which humankind was in better shape than in the early 21st century. Was it 1918? 1718? 1218? Nevertheless, people all over the world are now losing faith in the liberal order. Nationalist and religious views that privilege one human group over all others are back in vogue. Governments are increasingly restricting the flow of ideas, goods, money and people. Walls are popping up everywhere, both on the ground and in cyberspace. Immigration is out, tariffs are in. If the liberal order is collapsing, what new kind of global order might replace it? So far, those who challenge the liberal order do so mainly on a national level. They have many ideas about how to advance the interests of their particular country, but they don’t have a viable vision for how the world as a whole should function. For example, Russian nationalism can be a reasonable guide for running the affairs of Russia, but Russian nationalism has no plan for the rest of humanity. Unless, of course, nationalism morphs into imperialism, and calls for one nation to conquer and rule the entire world. A century ago, several nationalist movements indeed harboured such imperialist fantasies. Today’s nationalists, whether in Russia, Turkey, Italy or China, so far refrain from advocating global conquest. In place of violently establishing a global empire, some nationalists such as Steve Bannon, Viktor Orban, the Northern League in Italy and the British Brexiteers dream about a peaceful “Nationalist International”. They argue that all nations today face the same enemies. The bogeymen of globalism, multiculturalism and immigration are threatening to destroy the traditions and identities of all nations. Therefore nationalists across the world should make common cause in opposing these global forces. Hungarians, Italians, Turks and Israelis should build walls, erect fences and slow down the movement of people, goods, money and ideas. The world will then be divided into distinct nation-states, each with its own sacred identity and traditions. Based on mutual respect for these differing identities, all nation-states could cooperate and trade peacefully with one another. Hungary will be Hungarian, Turkey will be Turkish, Israel will be Israeli, and everyone will know who they are and what is their proper place in the world. It will be a world without immigration, without universal values, without multiculturalism, and without a global elite—but with peaceful international relations and some trade. In a word, the “Nationalist International” envisions the world as a network of walled-but-friendly fortresses. Many people would think this is quite a reasonable vision. Why isn’t it a viable alternative to the liberal order? Two things should be noted about it. First, it is still a comparatively liberal vision. It assumes that no human group is superior to all others, that no nation should dominate its peers, and that international cooperation is better than conflict. In fact, liberalism and nationalism were originally closely aligned with one another. The 19th century liberal nationalists, such as Giuseppe Garibaldi and Giuseppe Mazzini in Italy, and Adam Mickiewicz in Poland, dreamt about precisely such an international liberal order of peacefully-coexisting nations. The second thing to note about this vision of friendly fortresses is that it has been tried—and it failed spectacularly. All attempts to divide the world into clear-cut nations have so far resulted in war and genocide. When the heirs of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Mickiewicz managed to overthrow the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, it proved impossible to find a clear line dividing Italians from Slovenes or Poles from Ukrainians. This had set the stage for the second world war. The key problem with the network of fortresses is that each national fortress wants a bit more land, security and prosperity for itself at the expense of the neighbors, and without the help of universal values and global organisations, rival fortresses cannot agree on any common rules. Walled fortresses are seldom friendly. But if you happen to live inside a particularly strong fortress, such as America or Russia, why should you care? Some nationalists indeed adopt a more extreme isolationist position. They don’t believe in either a global empire or in a global network of fortresses. Instead, they deny the necessity of any global order whatsoever. “Our fortress should just raise the drawbridges,” they say, “and the rest of the world can go to hell. We should refuse entry to foreign people, foreign ideas and foreign goods, and as long as our walls are stout and the guards are loyal, who cares what happens to the foreigners?” Such extreme isolationism, however, is completely divorced from economic realities. Without a global trade network, all existing national economies will collapse—including that of North Korea. Many countries will not be able even to feed themselves without imports, and prices of almost all products will skyrocket. The made-in-China shirt I am wearing cost me about $5. If it had been produced by Israeli workers from Israeli-grown cotton using Israeli-made machines powered by non-existing Israeli oil, it may well have cost ten times as much. Nationalist leaders from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin may therefore heap abuse on the global trade network, but none thinks seriously of taking their country completely out of that network. And we cannot have a global trade network without some global order that sets the rules of the game. Even more importantly, whether people like it or not, humankind today faces three common problems that make a mockery of all national borders, and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. You cannot build a wall against nuclear winter or against global warming, and no nation can regulate artificial intelligence (AI) or bioengineering single-handedly. It won’t be enough if only the European Union forbids producing killer robots or only America bans genetically-engineering human babies. Due to the immense potential of such disruptive technologies, if even one country decides to pursue these high-risk high-gain paths, other countries will be forced to follow its dangerous lead for fear of being left behind. An AI arms race or a biotechnological arms race almost guarantees the worst outcome. Whoever wins the arms race, the loser will likely be humanity itself. For in an arms race, all regulations will collapse. Consider, for example, conducting genetic-engineering experiments on human babies. Every country will say: “We don’t want to conduct such experiments—we are the good guys. But how do we know our rivals are not doing it? We cannot afford to remain behind. So we must do it before them.” Similarly, consider developing autonomous-weapon systems, that can decide for themselves whether to shoot and kill people. Again, every country will say: “This is a very dangerous technology, and it should be regulated carefully. But we don’t trust our rivals to regulate it, so we must develop it first”. The only thing that can prevent such destructive arms races is greater trust between countries. This is not an impossible mission. If today the Germans promise the French: “Trust us, we aren’t developing killer robots in a secret laboratory under the Bavarian Alps,” the French are likely to believe the Germans, despite the terrible history of these two countries. We need to build such trust globally. We need to reach a point when Americans and Chinese can trust one another like the French and Germans. Similarly, we need to create a global safety-net to protect humans against the economic shocks that AI is likely to cause. Automation will create immense new wealth in high-tech hubs such as Silicon Valley, while the worst effects will be felt in developing countries whose economies depend on cheap manual labor. There will be more jobs to software engineers in California, but fewer jobs to Mexican factory workers and truck drivers. We now have a global economy, but politics is still very national. Unless we find solutions on a global level to the disruptions caused by AI, entire countries might collapse, and the resulting chaos, violence and waves of immigration will destabilise the entire world. This is the proper perspective to look at recent developments such as Brexit. In itself, Brexit isn’t necessarily a bad idea. But is this what Britain and the EU should be dealing with right now? How does Brexit help prevent nuclear war? How does Brexit help prevent climate change? How does Brexit help regulate artificial intelligence and bioengineering? Instead of helping, Brexit makes it harder to solve all of these problems. Every minute that Britain and the EU spend on Brexit is one less minute they spend on preventing climate change and on regulating AI. In order to survive and flourish in the 21st century, humankind needs effective global cooperation, and so far the only viable blueprint for such cooperation is offered by liberalism. Nevertheless, governments all over the world are undermining the foundations of the liberal order, and the world is turning into a network of fortresses. The first to feel the impact are the weakest members of humanity, who find themselves without any fortress willing to protect them: refugees, illegal migrants, persecuted minorities. But if the walls keep rising, eventually the whole of humankind will feel the squeeze.

## 2AC

### Competitiveness

#### blanket kritik of hegemonic power is ethically unjustifiable. Reigning in worst aspect of American power solves their offense but preserves ethical good of avoiding conflict.

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The final ethical position — the polar opposite of the first — holds that the exercise of hegemonic power is never ethically justifiable. One source of such a position might be pacifist thought, which abhors the use of violence even in unambiguous cases of self-defence. This would not, however, provide a comprehensive critique of the exercise of hegemonic power, which takes forms other than overt violence, such as economic diplomacy or the manipulation of international institutions. A more likely source of such critique would be the multifarious literature that equates all power with domination. Postmodernists (and anarch­ists, for that matter) might argue that behind all power lies self-interest and a will to control, both of which are antithetical to genuine human freedom and diversity. Rad­ical liberals might contend that the exercise of power by one human over another transforms the latter from a moral agent into a moral subject, thus violating their in­tegrity as self-governing individuals. Whatever the source, these ideas lead to radical scepticism about all institutions of power, of which hegemony is one form. The idea that the state is a source of individual security is replaced here with the idea of the state as a tyranny; the idea of hegem­ony as essential to the provision of global public goods is A framework for judgement Which of the above ideas help us to evaluate the ethics of the Bush Administration's revisionist hegemonic project? There is a strong temptation in international relations scholarship to mount trenchant defences of favoured para­digms, to show that the core assumptions of one's pre­ferred theory can be adapted to answer an ever widening set of big and important questions. There is a certain discipline of mind that this cultivates, and it certainly brings some order to theoretical debates, but it can lead to the 'Cinderella syndrome', the squeezing of an un­gainly, over-complicated world into an undersized theor­etical glass slipper. The study of international ethics is not immune this syndrome, with a long line of scholars seeking master normative principles of universal applic­ability. My approach here is a less ambitious, more prag­matic one. With the exceptions of the first and last positions, each of the above ethical perspectives contains kernels of wisdom. The challenge is to identify those of value for evaluating the ethics of Bush's revisionist grand strategy, and to consider how they might stand in order of priority. The following discussion takes up this challenge and arrives at a position that I tentatively term 'procedural solidarism'. The first and last of our five ethical positions can be dismissed as unhelpful to our task. The idea that might is right resonates with the cynical attitude we often feel to­wards the darker aspects of international relations, but it does not constitute an ethical standpoint from which to judge the exercise of hegemonic power. First of all, it places the right of moral judgement in the hands of the hegemon, and leaves all of those subject to its actions with no grounds for ethical critique. What the hegemon dictates as ethical is ethical. More than this, though, the principle that might is right is undiscriminating. It gives us no resources to determine ethical from unethical hegemonic conduct. The idea that might is never right is equally unsatisfying. It is a principle implied in many critiques of imperial power, including of American power. But like its polar opposite, it is utterly undiscriminating. No matter what the hegemon does we are left with one blanket assessment. No procedure, no selfless goal is worthy of ethical endorsement. This is a deeply impoverished ethical posture, as it raises the critique of power above all other human values. It is also completely counter-intuitive. Had the United States intervened militarily to prevent the Rwandan genocide, would this not have been ethically justifiable? If one answers no, then one faces the difficult task of explaining why the exercise of hegemonic power would have been a greater evil than allowing almost a million people to be massacred. If one answers yes, then one is admitting that a more discriminating set of ethical principles is needed than the simple yet enticing propos­ition that might is never right.

#### Security is a global public good and an inherent need for all people. Abandoning security empowers private security.

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Faced with such inhospitable conditions, one can easily lapse into fatalistic despair, letting events simply come as they will, or else seek refuge in the consolations offered by the total critique of securitization practices – a path that some critical scholars in criminology and security studies have found all too seductive (e.g. Bigo 2002, 2006; Walters 2003). Or one can, as we have done, supplement social criticism with the hard, uphill, necessarily painstaking work of seeking to specify what it may mean for citizens to live together securely with risk; to think about the social and political arrangements capable of making this possibility more rather than less likely, and to do what one can to nurture practices of collective security shaped not by fugitive market power or by the unfettered actors of (un)civil society, but by an inclusive, democratic politics. Social analysts of crime and security have become highly attuned to, and warned repeatedly of, the illiberal, exclusionary effects of the association between security and political community (Dillon 1996; Hughes 2007). They have not, it should be said, done so without cause, for reasons we set out at some length as the book unfolds. But this sharp sensitivity to the risks of thinking about security through a communitarian lens has itself come at a price, namely, that of failing to address and theorize fully the virtues and social benefits that can flow from members of a political community being able to put and pursue security in common. This, it seems to us, is a failure to heed the implications of the stake that all citizens have in security; to appreciate the closer alignment of self-interest and altruism that can attend the acknowledgement that we are forced to live, as Kant put it, inescapably side-by-side and that individuals simultaneously constitute and threaten one another’s security; and to register the security-enhancing significance and value of the affective bonds of trust and abstract solidarity that political communities depend upon, express and sustain. All this, we think, offers reasons to believe that security offers a conduit, perhaps the best conduit there is, for giving practical meaning to the idea of the public good, for reinventing social democratic politics, even for renewing the activity of politics at all. These, of course, may prove to be naïve hopes, futile whistling in a cold and hostile wind. It is in addition true that the project of civilizing security is ultimately a question not of social theory but of political praxis. But if such a project is ever to be thematized as a politics it requires, or at least can be furthered by, some form of theoretical articulation; one which reminds us, as C. L. R. James (1963) might have said, that those who know only of security of security nothing know. It is with this overarching purpose in mind that we have been moved to write in the way that we have about security today. Our argument in this book is that security is a valuable public good, a constitutive ingredient of the good society, and that the democratic state has a necessary and virtuous role to play in the production of this good. The state, and in particular the forms of public policing governed by it, is, we shall argue, indispensable to the task of fostering and sustaining liveable political communities in the contemporary world. It is, in the words of our title, pivotal to the project of civilizing security. By invoking this phrase we have in mind two ideas, both of which we develop in the course of the book. The first, which is relatively familiar if not uncontroversial, is that security needs civilizing. States – even those that claim with some justification to be ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’ – have a capacity when self-consciously pursuing a condition called ‘security’ to act in a fashion injurious to it. So too do non-state ‘security’ actors, a point we return to below and throughout the book. They proceed in ways that trample over the basic liberties of citizens; that forge security for some groups while imposing illegitimate burdens of insecurity upon others, or that extend the coercive reach of the state – and security discourse – over social and political life. As monopoly holders of the means of legitimate physical and symbolic violence, modern states possess a built-in, paradoxical tendency to undermine the very liberties and security they are constituted to protect. Under conditions of fear, such as obtain across many parts of the globe today, states and their police forces are prone to deploying their power in precisely such uncivil, insecurity instilling ways. If the state is to perform the ordering and solidarity nourishing work that we argue is vital to the production of secure political communities then it must, consequently, be connected to forms of discursive contestation, democratic scrutiny and constitutional control. The state is a great civilizing force, a necessary and virtuous component of the good society. But if it is to take on this role, the state must itself be civilized – made safe by and for democracy. But our title also has another, less familiar meaning – the idea that security is civilizing. Individuals who live, objectively or subjectively, in a state of anxiety do not make good democratic citizens, as European theorists reflecting upon the dark days of the 1930s and 1940s knew well (Neumann 1957). Fearful citizens tend to be inattentive to, unconcerned about, even enthusiasts for, the erosion of basic freedoms. They often lack openness or sympathy towards others, especially those they apprehend as posing a danger to them. They privilege the known over the unknown, us over them, here over there. They often retreat from public life, seeking refuge in private security ‘solutions’ while at the same time screaming anxiously and angrily from the sidelines for the firm hand of authority – for tough ‘security’ measures against crime, or disorder, or terror. Prolonged episodes of violence, in particular, can erode or destroy people’s will and capacity to exercise political judgement and act in solidarity with others (Keane 2004: 122–3). Fear, in all these ways, is the breeding ground, as well as the stock-in-trade, of authoritarian, uncivil government. But there is more to it than that. Security is also civilizing in a further, more positive sense. Security, we shall argue, is in a sociological sense a ‘thick’ public good, one whose production has irreducibly social dimensions, a good that helps to constitute the very idea of ‘publicness’. Security, in other words, is simultaneously the producer and product of forms of trust and abstract solidarity between intimates and strangers that are prerequisite to democratic political communities. The state, moreover, performs vital cultural and ordering work in fashioning the good of security conceived of in this sense. It can, under the right conditions, create inclusive communities of practice and attachment, while ensuring that these remain rights-regarding, diversity respecting entities. In a world where the state’s pre-eminence in governing security is being questioned by private-sector interests, practices of local communal ordering and transnational policing networks, the constitution of old- and new-fashioned forms of democratic political authority is, we shall argue, indispensable to cultivating and sustaining the civilizing effects of security. Security and its discontents Raising these possibilities is, of course, to invite a whole series of obvious but nonetheless significant questions: what is security? What does it mean to be or to feel secure? Who or what is the proper object of security – individuals, collectivities, states, humanity at large? What social and political arrangements are most conducive to the production of security? It is also to join – in a global age that is now also an age of terror – a highly charged political debate about the meanings and value of security as a good, and about how it may best be pursued. It is these questions, and this debate, that we want to address in this book. Security has become the political vernacular of our times. This has long been so in respect of ‘law and order’ within nation states. Authoritarian regimes are routinely in the habit of using the promise and rhetoric of security as a means of fostering allegiance and sustaining their rule – delivering safe streets while (and by) placing their citizens in fear of the early morning knock at the door (Michnik 1998). Democratic societies too have over the last several decades come to be governed through the prism of crime – a phenomenon especially marked in the USA, Britain and Australasia, though not without resonance in other liberal democratic states (Garland 2001; Simon 2006; see also Newburn and Sparks 2004). But security has also since 9/11, and the ‘war on terror’ waged in response to it, become a pervasive and contested element of world politics, impacting significantly on the ‘interior’ life of states and international and transnational relations in ways, as we shall see, that escalate the breakdown of once settled distinctions between internal and external security, war and crime, policing and soldiering (Kaldor 1999; Bigo 2000a). Today, security politics is riven by disagreements over the pros and cons of self-consciously seeking security using predominantly policing and military means; by disputes about how and whether to ‘balance’ security with such other goods as freedom, justice and democracy; and by conflicts between a conception of security as protection from physical harm and wider formulations of ‘human’ or ‘global’ security. In the face of these debates we are aware that the title and ambitions of this text are likely to meet with one of three possible responses. They will be seen by some as offensive to the benign intentions and purposes of governments and security actors. They may be viewed, alternatively, as the naïve, wrong-headed pursuit of an oxymoron. Or they may be dismissed – by those who share our broad ambition to civilize security – as too limited in their grasp of what the idea of security can and should mean. We want to probe a little further into each of these anticipated reactions. In so doing, we can begin to pinpoint the limitations of certain established dispositions towards, and public discourses about, security, as well as indicating how the debate about security can be moved to a different – we think more fruitful – place.1 The first – currently hegemonic – response issues from a lobby that seeks fairly unambiguously to promote security and that takes exception to the idea that security needs civilizing. Security, on this view, is an unqualified human good. The protection of its people from internal and external threats stands consequently as the first and defining priority of government. Far from needing to be balanced with democratic rights and freedoms, security is a precondition for the enjoyment of such goods. Far from needing ‘civilizing’, security is the foundation stone and hallmark of civilization. Security, moreover, can and should be directly and consciously pursued using what Joseph Nye (2002) calls ‘hard power’ – by enabling, resourcing and enthusiastically backing the military, intelligence agencies and the police. It is these agencies that will protect the state and its citizens, and these agencies whose purposes and effectiveness must not be hamstrung by excessive legal rights and safeguards that give succour to the enemy, or by forms of democratic deliberation that obstruct decisive executive action. This – stripped to its essentials – is the discourse that has animated countless ‘wars on drugs’ and ‘crackdowns’ on crime and disorder in both democratic and authoritarian states over recent decades, and which since 9/11 has fuelled and justified what may turn out to be a permanent ‘war on terror’. This disposition towards, and identification with, security has long antecedents dating back to Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, and is deeply sedimented in the present (Robin 2004). It represents the clearsighted and hard-headed outlook of a good many politicians and police officers. It holds – for anxious citizens – a deep emotional allure. But it is not without some serious shortcomings, two of which warrant an introductory note. It proceeds, first of all, in ways that gloss over the paradoxes that attend the pursuit of security (Berki 1986: ch. 1; Zedner 2003). It has little to say, and rarely pauses to reflect upon, the most profound of these; namely, that the state’s concentration of coercive power makes it simultaneously a guarantor of and a threat to the security of individuals. Security, as Berki (1986: 13) puts it, is inescapably a problem for and a problem of the state – a condition we deal with more fully in later chapters (see also N. Walker 2000: ch. 1). Nor does the security lobby grasp clearly the implications of how human beings are mutually implicated in one another’s in/security – as both an everpresent potential threat to the security of each, and at the same time a necessary precondition for giving effect to such security. Still less does the security lobby register and absorb the fact that security is, in an important sense, destined to remain beyond our grasp – ‘more within us as a yearning, than without us as a fact’ (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 85). Not only does this mean that there can never – in a paradox rich with implications – be ‘enough’ security measures, which hold out a promise of protection while always also signifying the presence of threat and danger. It also warns us that responding to demands for order in the terms in which they present themselves (i.e. zero-tolerant police, tougher sentencing, more prisons, ‘wars’ against drugs, or crime, or terror) can be little more than a bid to quench the unquenchable. The effacing of paradoxes such as these is closely connected to – indeed a key contributor towards – the second and most deleterious shortcoming of the security lobby. This is its tendency to make security pervasive, to proceed in ways that treat and thereby produce ‘security’ – or, more accurately, security rhetoric and activity – as a dominant, emotionally charged element of political culture and everyday life. Security – as Buzan et al. (1998) usefully remind us – is not only a condition of social existence, a description of social relations marked by order and tranquillity. It is also a political practice, a speech act, one way of framing and naming problems. To call something ‘security’ – to make what Buzan et al. (1998: 25) call a ‘securitizing move’ – is to suggest, and to seek to mobilize audiences behind, the idea that ‘we’ face an existential threat that calls for immediate, decisive, special measures. It is, in other words, to seek to lift the issue at hand – whether it is crime, or drugs, or migration – out of the realm of normal democratic politics, to claim that as an emergency it demands an urgent, even exceptional, response. The security lobby – blessed as it invariably is with ‘blind credulity and passionate certainty’ (Holmes 1993: 250) – makes precisely this move. It connects with and articulates public insecurities about crime, or disorder, or terror in terms that institutionalize anxiety as a feature of everyday life and link security to a conception of political community organized around binary oppositions between us/them, here/there, friends/enemies, inside/outside. In encouraging ‘emotional fusion between ruler and ruled’ around the question of fear (Holmes 1993: 49), it generates a climate that inhibits – even actively deters – critical scrutiny of the state’s claims and practices. By translating security into Security, into a matter of cops chasing robbers, soldiers engaging the enemy, it risks fostering vicious circles of insecurity (atrocity – fear – tough response – atrocity – fear – and so on) that ratchet up police powers, security technologies and their attendant rhetoric in ways that it becomes difficult then to temper or dismantle. In all these ways, the security lobby makes ‘security’ talk and action pervasive, or what we shall call shallow and wide, reproducing ‘security’ on the surface of social consciousness and rendering it dependent on the visible display of executive authority and police power. In so doing, it fails to get close to the heart of what it is that makes individuals objectively (or intersubjectively) and subjectively secure – it is unable, that is, to understand, still less to create, the conditions under which security becomes axiomatic, or deep and narrow. For us, these are vital distinctions, ones that we revisit and develop as our argument unfolds. The second response to our stated ambitions – the one likely to regard the enterprise as hopelessly misplaced – is concerned above all to counter security. This emanates from what we may call the ‘liberty lobby’ which disputes the suggestion that security can be civilized. Security, on this view, is a troubling, dangerous idea. Security politics – especially in the form we have just set out – is seen as authoritarian and potentially barbarous – ‘contrary to civil well-being’ (Keane 2004: 46). It is a politics that privileges state interests (and conceptions of security) over those of individuals; that is inimical to democratic values; that possesses a seductive capacity to trample – in the name, and with the support, of ‘the majority’ – over civil liberties and minority rights; that is, in short, conducive to the very violence that it purports to stamp out. Security, consequently, is something that must either be curbed in the name of liberty and human rights or, given its close police and military associations, abandoned as a value altogether. Let us briefly introduce two strands of this critical disposition. The first – common to human rights movements across the globe – seeks to constrain the power of security by questioning its imperatives, and fencing in its demands, with an insistence on protecting or enhancing the democratic freedoms and individual rights that security politics is indifferent to, throws into a utilitarian calculus, chips away at, or suspends. From this standpoint, habeas corpus, access to legal advice, limits on detention and police interrogative powers, jury trials, rights of appeal and the like are the expression and tools of a desire to preserve a space for individual liberty in the face of the forceful demands of an overweening state and global state system – whether in ‘normal’ or ‘exceptional’ times.2 A second stance – associated with those working under the loose banner of ‘critical security studies’ (Krause andWilliams 1997) – deepens and radicalizes the impulse and insights of the first. This holds that security is irredeemably tainted by its police/military parentage, and by its authoritarian desires for certainty. On this view, security is a political technology that must ‘continue to produce images of insecurity in order to retain its meaning’ (A. Burke 2002: 18) in ways that make it, at a conceptual level, inimical to democratic politics; or else it is a practice deeply tarred by its intimate empirical relation to the formation and reproduction of state-centric interests and xenophobic, anti-democratic political subjectivities and collective identities (R. B. J. Walker 1997). The conclusion in either case is the same. Security, it is claimed, has to be abandoned, the dual analytical and political task being to unsettle and deconstruct security as a category so as to find ways of thinking and acting beyond it (Dillon 1996; Aradau 2004). There is much of value in this critique of uncivil security – a great deal, in fact, which we are sympathetic towards. But these critical stances also share certain lacunae. Each, in particular, expressly or implicitly intimates that security – understood as being and feeling free from the threat of physical harm – is a problem, a conservative sensibility and project that is all too often hostile to the values and institutional practices of democracy and liberty (Huysmans 2002). The result is that each operates as a negative, oppositional force, one that evacuates the terrain that the security lobby so effectively and affectively occupies in favour of a stance that strives either to temper its worst excesses, or to trash and banish the idea altogether – a stance that appeals in part because so few others appear motivated to defend the liberties which are being imperilled. There is, on this view, little or no mileage in seeking to think in constructive terms about the good of security and the kind of good that security is. There is little point in fashioning a theory and praxis that explores the positive – democracy and liberty-enhancing – ways in which security and political community may be coupled; in reflecting upon what it means, and might take, to make security axiomatic to lived social relations. There can, in short, be no politics of civilizing security. Proponents of the third – ‘human’ or ‘social security’ – response share with us both a desire to transcend this received security–liberty dichotomy and, in their own way, an ambition to civilize security. On this view, however, such a project requires that security be rescued from a taken-for-granted association with the ‘threat, use and control of military force’ (Walt 1991: 212), and extended to other domains of social and political life (e.g. de Lint and Virta 2004).3 We can usefully highlight two variants of this position – one international, the other domestic. The former takes its cue from the United Nations Human Development Report 1994, which introduced, and sought to mobilize opinion behind, the concept of ‘human security’, an idea which has subsequently been taken up in further work conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and the European Union (Commission on Human Security 2003; Barcelona Group 2004; cf. Paris 2001). It seeks to decouple security from questions of war and peace and deploy it as a device aimed at urging governments to treat as emergencies such chronic threats as hunger, homelessness, disease and ecological degradation – the latter, for instance, being described by the Commission on Global Governance (1995: 83) as ‘the ultimate security threat’. The domestic version of the argument draws from the insight that there is no policing or penal solution to the problem of order the conclusion that crime control – or harm reduction – is ultimately a matter of, and dissolves into, questions of economic and social policy more generally. This is a commonly held disposition within both sociological criminology and social democratic politics, one which has in recent years informed a critique of situational crime prevention, crime science and other forms of technocratic crime control, and underpinned the promotion of multi-agency, social crime prevention (Crawford 1997; Hope and Karstedt 2003). On this view, security conceived of in a ‘shallow’ manner as freedom from physical harm or threat is both inseparable from a more profound sense of ‘well-being’ or ‘ontological’ security and, therefore, also dependent upon the broader institutions and services of social welfare (Fredman forthcoming). There is, once more, much to applaud in this attempt to extend the meanings and application of the idea of security. It reminds us that freedom from physical coercion is but a part of any rounded conception of human flourishing. And it pinpoints the limited and often counter-productive role that security politics and policing institutions play within this wider project. But there are difficulties with this attempt to broaden and extend security. It too – like the liberty lobby – tends to abandon the contest over how to render individuals and groups free from the threat and fear of physical coercion – in this case by a hasty and undue relegation of the significance of security in its ‘shallow’ sense. But it also, more importantly, transcends the security–liberty opposition in a fashion that risks making security pervasive in new ways. It does so, in respect of intranational crime, by connecting security to better education, full employment, or improved social conditions in a manner that tends to colonize, or ‘criminalize’, public policy such that the latter loses sight of its own values and objectives and comes instead to be thought about, funded and judged as an instrument of crime or harm reduction. The quest for ontological security, in other words, itself risks being ‘securitized’ in ways that render security pervasive in a more expansive sense than already indicated: as simultaneously deep and wide, such that any reconsideration of its preconditions is treated as a threat, prompting both parochial, xenophobic reactions and calls for more security in the shallow – police- and punishment centred – sense. Internationally, human security discourse likewise risks extending the dynamics and dangers of ‘securitization’, with all its antipolitical talk of existential threats and attendant calls for emergency measures, from the military to the political, economic, societal and environmental sectors (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 1998). By extending the reach of security in these ways, this position evacuates the terrain of contemporary security politics (and with it the struggle to make security axiomatic) in favour of a politics that risks turning all politics into security politics. In this book we take up the challenge of developing a fourth position – of thinking constructively about the relationship between security and political community through reconceptualizing security not as some kind of eigen-value embracing the whole of politics, but as a more modestly conceived but still ‘thick’ public good. We also indicate how – under conditions of pluralization and globalization – we may realize this revised conception of security in terms of institutional principles and design. In making good on these ambitions, we clearly need to counter the charge that ‘civilizing’ security (or anything else for that matter) inevitably carries with it a class and colonial baggage – amounting to a mission to bring ‘our’ standards and ways of doing things to a backward, barbarian ‘them’, whether at home or abroad. We try to do so as the book unfolds. For now it is sufficient to record the intuition that guides our enquiry: namely, that there is something to be gained from thinking through the connection between a family of words – civil, civility, civilizing, civilization – that have to do with taming violence and fostering respectful dialogue, and another family – politics, polity, policy, police – that have to do with the regulatory and cultural frameworks within which such democratic peace building may best take place (Keane 2004: chs. 3–4).4 Our aim is not to effect a banal compromise, or occupy some implausible middle ground, between the outlooks of the security and liberty lobbies. We want instead to step outside the terms of the confrontation in a bid to move discussion of security to a different place altogether. In his work on authenticity, Charles Taylor describes this as an ‘act of retrieval’, a phrase that captures well the activity we have in mind. A work of retrieval, Taylor says: suggests . . . that we identify and articulate the higher ideal behind the more or less debased practices, and then criticize these practices from the standpoint of their own motivating ideal. In other words, instead of dismissing this culture altogether, or just endorsing it as it is, we ought to attempt to raise its practice by making more palpable to its participants what the ethic they subscribe to really involves. (1991: 72) To engage in such retrieval in respect of security requires neither ‘root and branch condemnation’, nor ‘uncritical praise’, still less ‘a carefully balanced trade-off’ between the received ideas and practices of security and liberty (1991: 23). It demands instead taking security seriously as a ‘moral’ category and engaging in a struggle to define its ‘proper meaning’ as a ‘motivating ideal’ (1991: 73). This requires, or so it seems to us, that we recover and develop two somewhat buried or neglected meanings of security. We need, first of all, to emphasize, as the human security scholars have rightly done, the idea of the individual as the basic moral unit and referent of security – an idea that originates in the political theory of modernity.5 That individuation of security necessarily implies and so alerts us to the irreducibly subjective dimension of security, an idea that led Montesquieu to opine that ‘political freedom consists in security, or at least in the opinion one has of one’s security’ (cited in Rothschild 1995: 61; see also McSweeney 1998: ch. 1). This in turn provides a cue for a second act of retrieval; namely, of the root Latin meaning of securitas as freedom from concern, care or anxiety, a state of self-assurance or well-founded confidence. What this recovered cluster of meanings indicates is that security possesses subjective as well as objective dimensions, and that in both dimensions the ‘surfaces’ of physical security are intricately connected to the ‘depths’ of ontological security. And it is this intimate link between security and generic questions of social connectedness and solidarity that elevates it above terms like order, protection and safety as an orchestrating theme for our enquiry. The sense that security is about the relationship individuals have to the intimates and strangers they dwell among and the political communities they dwell within, and that it may therefore be connected in mutually supportive ways to the values and practices of ‘belonging’ and ‘critical freedom’ (Tully 2002), is what inspires our attempt to construct an alternative theory and praxis of security.

#### Case outweighs – China threat real.

Jacob Stokes, senior policy analyst in the China Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace, 8-14-2020, “The Chinese Military Threat Is Real,” Democracy Journal, <https://democracyjournal.org/arguments/the-chinese-military-threat-is-real/>

Taking seriously the prospect of Chinese aggression does not require viewing Beijing as an avaricious power that is seeking global domination—the CCP is not the Nazis or the Soviets. China’s narrower goals, however, are still dangerous. Beijing defines its sovereign territory expansively to include Taiwan, disputed islands and rocks in the East and South China seas along with the waters themselves, and land on the border with India. Therefore, even “defensive” goals seek to redraw the map, using force if necessary, with major implications for the United States and its alliance commitments, especially with Japan and the Philippines. Xi told former U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis that China would not compromise on “even one inch” of territory it claims.

Beijing’s implicit long-term goals are also fueling tensions. No one outside of Xi Jinping and his inner circle can know Beijing’s intentions with absolute certainty. Plus, ambitions can expand over time. But a straightforward reading of China’s aspirations based on scouring statements from leaders and official documents includes revising the political and security order in Asia to reduce the role of Washington and its regional alliances, thereby removing the major constraint on Chinese power. In essence, China seeks a tacit dominance in a hierarchical Asia with Beijing at the top. When Xi talks about building an “Asia for Asians” and a “community with a shared future for mankind” that is what he means.

If Xi succeeds, it would mean a region where power tramples rules, where rights are subordinate to Party dictates, and where markets are fixed for favored companies instead of being open and competitive. Beijing seeks to make the world safe for the protection and consolidation of its domestic autocracy. So, a region and world under China’s sway will likely resemble its domestic system. The brazen snuffing out of Hong Kong’s autonomy in violation of Beijing’s treaty obligations, systematic atrocities against the Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, and universal crackdown on liberties throughout the country give us a preview

### Dependency Trap

#### Futurity is inevitable, it’s only a question of what kind — futurity isn’t naïve hope, it’s a response to material reality

Kuttner, PhD, 17 (Paul, associate director at University Neighborhood Partners, University of Utah“Futurism, Futurity, and the Importance of the Existential Imagination,” <http://culturalorganizing.org/futurism-futurity/>)

Organizers and activists also seem to be taking an increased interest in the future. In 2015, the Movement for Black Lives and Huffington Post launched an annual celebration of Black Futures Month, a remixing of Black History Month that calls on people to “seize the opportunity to change the course of history by shaping our future.” That same year, AK press put out Octavia’s Brood, an engrossing collection of SF short stories written by activists and organizers. Of course, social justice organizing is often driven by a vision of a future better than the one we live in. But something deeper is going on here: a recognition that the future, despite its intangibility, is directly impacting us today. Take US politics. The election campaign that lifted 45 to the presidency was premised largely on fear of the future. In his speeches and tweets, 45 conjured an imagined future in which the US is overrun by “terrorists,” “rapists,” and “criminals” from across our borders. In this racist, dystopian future, white people sacrifice power and safety amid hostile aliens. This future is not real in any concrete sense. And yet, it affects the present in multiple ways — increasing support for racist policies, emboldening white supremacist organizations, and igniting hate crimes, just to name a few. In this sense, the future is what Andrew Baldwin calls a “permanent virtuality,” unreal and yet ever-present.6 Scholars have taken to using the term futurity to explore these interactions between past, present, and future. From my reading, futurity refers to three main dynamics: The ways that the future is defined (or “rendered knowable”) through practices such as prediction, projection, imagination, prefiguration, and prophecy;7 The ways that the future impacts the present, for example through fear, hope, preparation, and preemption;8and The ways that our thoughts and actions in reference to the future make some futures more likely, and others less likely, to come about.9 In his book Cruising Utopia, José Esteban Muñoz proposes that queerness is a kind of futurity. “Queerness,” he writes in the book’s introduction, “is not yet here…Put another way, we are not yet queer.”10 Instead, he explains, queerness is an ideal. It is a utopian vision that can help us to see beyond our everyday restrictions toward new possibilities. We cannot touch queerness with our hands, or claim to fully know what it is. We can, however, get glimpses of it, particularly in the realm of cultural production. Through poems, plays, visual art, dance, and other types of performance, artists can step away from what Munoz calls “straight time” — that sense that the present is natural and enduring — to suggest alternative futurities. The concept of futurity seems to have been most fully developed by Indigenous scholars and activists. As Native scholars have shown, settler colonialism (the kind of colonialism we have in the US, where the colonizer comes to stay) involves an ongoing project of erasure and replacement.11 After all, settler claims to the land in the Americas, the Pacific Islands, and elsewhere only make sense if the original inhabitants are gone. And, despite centuries of genocide, they are not. Part of the modern settler project, then, is to erase Indigenous peoples — if not physically (through policies that deny land, health care, etc.) or culturally (through blood quantum tests or the forced removal of children), then at least from popular consciousness. Movies, television shows, school curricula, political speeches, news reports, and other media relegate “the Indian” to our past — a sad chapter in history, perhaps, but nothing to concern ourselves with as we dream of the future. By erasing Indigenous people from the present and the future, these discourses advance the cause of what scholars like Eve Tuck call settler futurity. In other words, these discourses are premised on, and help to bring about, a future of endless settler dominance over the land and all that is on/of it.12 Indigenous communities, though, are (re)claiming the future — opening up space for indigenous futurities to flourish.13 To advance indigenous futurity is to assert, and takes steps to make possible, futures outside of settler colonialism. We can get glimpses of indigenous futurities in the social movement organizing of Idle No More, among the water protectors at Standing Rock, in the Indigenous media production of Indian and Cowboy, and in everyday assertions of Native culture and sovereignty. Noelani Goodyear-Kaʻōpua writes that, although they are often framed as relics of the past, Indigenous communities are actually at the front lines of the struggle to protect the future. Writing about Native Hawaiian efforts to defend cultural and natural resources, she notes that “When colonial discourses frame blockades at Newcastle or on Mauna a Wākea as obstructions on a march to “the future,” they miss the ways this kind of activism is actually protecting the possibilities of multiple futures.”14 This work is rooted deeply in Indigenous cultural practices and epistemologies, which, according to Hawaiian activist and blogger Bryan Kamaoli Kuwada, have always attended to both the past and the future. “The future is a realm we have inhabited for thousands of years. You cannot do otherwise when you rely on the land and sea to survive. All of our gathering practices and agricultural techniques, the patterned mat of loʻi kalo, the breath passing in and out of the loko iʻa, the Kū and Hina of picking plants are predicated on looking ahead. This ensures that the land is productive into the future, that the sea will still be abundant into the future, and that our people will still thrive into the future.”15 A Final Note When I was coming up in the world of social justice arts and organizing, much of the focus was on history. We studied how injustices like racism and colonialism were historically constructed. We learned how histories of activism and rebellion had been hidden, rewritten, and co-opted to reinforce the right of those in power to rule. We supported youth as they came to see themselves as part of long social movement traditions. This focus on the past was, and is, terribly important. At the same time, I am energized by what I see as a growing emphasis on the future as an arena of active struggle. Because that’s certainly how those in power see it. Wall street traders are gambling on our futures. Tech companies are redesigning our futures. Hollywood is whitewashing our futures. And all the while, unfettered capitalism is foreclosing so many healthy futures for this planet. Imagining alternative futures is, quite literally, a matter of life and death. The struggle for futurity is on, and as artists and cultural workers we are right in the middle of it, whether we know it or not. It’s time to accept the invitation of Bryan Kamaoli Kuwada: “We live in the future,” he writes. “Come join us.”16

### 2AC AT: K

#### Inside/outside dichotomy bad. No “spillover” and “in here” v “out there” relies on the antidemocrtic boundaries of elite worldmakers. Politics is authorized by laypeople circulating, discussing and normalizing policy.

Henrik Paul **BANG** University of Canberra · IGPA Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis **’15** *Foucault’s Political Challenge: From Hegemony to Truth* p. 27-31

Reconfiguring the topography of the common

Agamben is the one who best describes how the conversion of political authority into a superpower is brought about by those who see the problem of political power from the vantage point of an opposition between law and bare life. He makes use of Foucault’s early distinction between sovereignty and biopower, turning what Foucault describes – first as an opposition in Abnormal (A: 2003), and later on in Security, Territory, Population (STP: 2007) as a difference between sovereignty and security – into an identity, correlating the exceptionality of sovereignty with the exception of bare life. Hence, Agamben can translate the radical suspension of politics in the exception of bare life into the law of modern democracy, as defined by both Arendt and Kant. Biopolitics becomes democracy’s accomplice as a bare life between life and death. Hegemony becomes a mediation of Foucault’s notion of biopower as control over life and Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty as the power to decide on the state in which normal legality is suspended. The signature of hegemony shifts to one which positively intervenes between human and natural life as a new, more liberating form of domination for governing, neither the subject nor the enemy, but the sacred life of the people as a population. Or, as Rancière synthesizes Agamben’s attempt to overcome the opposition between absolute power and human rights (2010: 65–66), Democracy’s secret – the secret of modern power – can then emerge into full view. State power, now, is concretely concerned with bare life, itself no longer the life of the subject that the power wants to repress, nor the life of the enemy that it has to kill, but, Agamben says, a ‘sacred’ life – a life taken within a state of exception, a life ‘beyond oppression’. This signature of hegemony ‘beyond oppression’ presents itself as a command from above to show duty to otherness in political communities. Democracy as obedience to the rights of the Other in the res publica sweeps aside the heterogeneity of political dissensus in the name of a more radical heterogeneity. According to Rancière, this is to neglect how ‘dissensus is not a conflict of interests, opinions or values; it is a division inserted in “common sense” ’ (2010: 69). Dissensus is an ongoing dispute over what is given, and the frames in which we perceive and understand things as given. This is also how Foucault interprets politeia : democracy is not a matter of human rights; it is about the capability and knowledgeability of political subjects to place the scenes of dissensus in time and space. Rancière illustrates this point with the political struggles of women in Western history (2010: 69, emphasis in original): Women, as political subjects, set out to make a twofold statement. They demonstrated that they were deprived of the rights that theyhad thanks to the Declaration of Rights and that through their public action that they had the rights denied to them by the constitution, that they could enact those rights. They acted as subjects of the Rights of Man in the precise sense that I have mentioned. They acted as subjects that did not have the rights that they had and that had the rights they had not. This is what I call a dissensus: the putting of two worlds in one and the same world. Expressing political subjectivity in a political community is not a matter of being liberated from something or someone by something or someone. It is to reject, in one’s actual practice of freedom, being subjected to any political institution or human being. It is to deny that there is a superpower living in a sphere not only different from but also superior to the political community of free and equal subjects. It is to dismiss any categorizing of political actors by a Herrschaft making distinctions between superiors and subordinates, rulers and ruled, strong and weak, and so on. In a way, Foucault is pursuing exactly the same dual tactics as does Rancière above when he states that ‘nowadays, the struggles are against the forms of subjection – against the submission of subjectivity – is becoming more and more important’ (EW3: 351). He denies that mechanisms of subjection ‘merely constitute the “terminal” of more fundamental relations’ (EW3: 352), such as ideological or economic structures. Furthermore, like Rancière, Foucault is skeptical toward those who reduce subjectivation to a matter of ‘unfolding’ the program for a universal reason freed from domination in history, as if it were ‘possible to say that one thing is of the order of “deliberation” and another is of the order of “oppression” ’ (EW3: 354, emphasis in original): I do not think that there is anything that is functionally – by its very nature – absolutely liberating. Liberty is a practice . So there may, in fact, always be a certain number of projects whose aim is to modify some constraints, to loosen, or even to break them, but none of these projects can simply by its nature, assure that people will have freedom automatically, that it will be established by the project itself. Finally, like Rancière, Foucault denies that the exercise of hegemony in, and through, discursively structured and institutionalized asymmetries of power and signification is at the core of politics (FL: 444): It is within the field of the obligation of truth that it is possible to move about in one way or another, sometimes against effects of domination that may be linked to structures of truth or institutions entrusted with truth. It is a shame Rancière never sees this affinity between Foucault and himself when it comes to identifying how a political subject combines power, self-governance and knowledge as one who ‘can’, ‘will’ and ‘understands how to’ practice her freedoms inside a political community. Rather, he believes that ‘Foucault ... was never interested in this question, not at a theoretical level in any case. He was concerned with power’ (2010: 93). But he was interested. Unlike Mouffe and Rancière, Foucault does not analyze agonistic democracy in the shadow of antagonism and dissensus; nor does he reduce it to a manifestation of either hegemony or the popular will (EW3 1994c : 342): Rather than speaking of an essential antagonism, it would be better to speak of an ‘agonism’ – of a relationship that is at the same time mutual incitement and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation. To Foucault, agonistic democracy does not derive from any exception but from the unceasing tension between freedom and truth, politeia and parrhesia in ongoing processes of authorization and normalization. Problematization is at the core of these processes as chronic two-way contestations of the discursive practices of authority and community inside political systems: the problematization of how people are governed (govermentality) depends on the ethical elaborations of the subject (knowledge) for making a difference (power), whether acting as an incumbent of political authority or as a lay member of a political community. Therefore, rather than speaking of authorization and normalization as opposed to practices of subjectivation and intersubjectivation in political communities, and vice versa, we should consider their mutual autonomy and dependence (EW3: 343): The analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power relations and the ‘agonism’ between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is an increasingly political task – even, the political task that is inherent in all social existence. The relation of political authority as power-knowledge to governing, subjectivation and the practice of freedom is the basis of recurrently problematizing and criticizing any claim to political primacy in history. If Rancière had delved deeper into Foucault’s analyses of government by truth, he would surely have seen that Foucault’s critique of the sovereign state and the security state grows out of his conception of the political as an ensemble of discursive practices of power and freedom. 11 The state is not identical with the political, but one of its emergent properties. The duality of political authority and community It is easy to understand how Foucault could become identified with both the state of exception and the political community of exception. If one, for example, reads only Foucault’s early work on madness and discipline, the power/resistance dichotomy is the first that leaps out at one, as an indication of ‘the necessity of combat and the rules of strategy’ (DP: 308). The same holds good for his later lectures in STP (204), in which he speaks of ‘the coup d’Etat [as] the irruptive assertionof raison d’Etat ’. Statements like these cannot but leave the impression that Foucault’s politics is about sovereignty vs. law, power vs. resistance, hierarchy vs. anarchy, police vs. laypeople and so on. However, when Foucault focuses so much on statism and power/resistance in modernity, it is not because he thinks that hegemony and antagonism are at the core of the political, but precisely in order to problematize them both. To him, problematizing conflict means showing how things could be different (PK: 64): If one is interested in doing historical work that has political meaning, utility and effectiveness, then this is possible only if one has some kind of involvement with the struggles taking place in the area in question. I tried first to do a genealogy of psychiatry because I had had a certain amount of practical experience in psychiatric hospitals and was aware of the combats, the lines of force, tensions and points of collision which existed there. My historical work was undertaken only as a function of those conflicts. Foucault was from his young days actively engaged, practically as well as analytically, in problematizing how modern science and society continuously and systematically seek to cover up their exclusions behind a veil of rationality and legitimacy. To him, critique is not primarily to ‘scrutinise and restrain arbitrary power’ (Keane 2013: 245). It is, more than anything else, to problematize how, the more undistorted and thickly legitimated political decisions and actions appear and are believed to be, the better, more smoothly and unproblematically hierarchization, disciplinary subjection and policing function. In presupposing that political domination presents no special problems to democracy when first proved to be effective and legitimate for protecting and serving ‘We, the People’, modern reason turns a blind eye to its exclusions of otherness as ‘anomalies’ in or ‘deviations’ from the existing order. Authentic otherness is excluded from view a priori by reference to the necessity for removing any temporal or arbitrary disorder from society’s underlying general or necessary order. This is also Agamben’s and Rancière’s critique of modernity and the very reason why they both argue that the political is prior to law, just as dissensus is prior to consensus. But to Foucault it is the existence of the political authority relationship between political authorities and laypeople in their political communities that makes it all possible. It is not the state, whether as a sovereign state or as a security state, that identifies the political. Nor is it the democratic political community, which, as Rancière puts it (2010: 213, emphasis in original), breaks with consensus [in its] abolition of every form of arkhe , of every way of producing a correspondence between the places of governing and a ‘disposition’ to occupy these places. The politics of hegemony and dissensus are but two examples of the selftransforming capacity of political authority as a relationship involving freedom and power in both directions which could be balanced through the good parrhesia of freedom and truth. Foucault illustrates the fundamental duality of political authority and political community in his lectures from 1977 until he dies in 1984. He sets out by problematizing the conception of sovereignty as a unified entity, making up the space of the political as a coercive superpower over subjects within the prince’s or king’s territory. He shows how the original dilemma of sovereignty is its neglect of the facts that: ● one cannot govern a population as one governs a territory; ● g overning the construction of space is not the same as protecting and serving a home or place; ● t he functional delimitation of the political from all other necessary aspects of group life is a condition of demarcating the political territorially. The political is a general societal condition like those of the economic, the cultural and the religious; it is a constitutive aspect of all social and human relations, from the local to the global. Furthermore, its generality lies in its transformative capacity to do what could not be done without it: authorizing and normalizing the way policies are articulated, performed, delivered and evaluated**.** The fulfilment of these tasks does not depend on the maintenance of a centralized form of legitimate domination for acquiring effective control over subjects and society. It is necessary to accomplish them, however small the actual degree and extent of control the political authority may possess in relation to other political and nonpolitical forces, such as an informal ruling elite or an economic class. In this way, it is the notions of function, space, population and, most of all, the power-knowledge of subjectivation that show why Foucault wants to ‘decapitate the king’ and connect the politics of exception to the policy of cooperation for handling or solving common concerns. The analysis of political authority and democracy as revealing the identity of opposites does not only block a problematization of the juridical–statist identification of the political with an overarching norm that needs a hegemonic superpower to assert itself in the validation, rather than in the suspension, of this norm (Agamben 2005: 86). It also hinders the recoding of the political as a complex or ensemble of discursive practices for deciding on and doing policies in an acceptable manner, which is distinctly open to the possibility of self-governance and co-governance from below. Finally, to make the quest for social control within one’s territory the primary task of democratic government is not merely to reduce the common interest to a superpower’s national interest; it is also to disregard how a central political authority, in the long run, can only become stronger by enabling and empowering the population to get better at governing and taking care of itself as a community of equal subjects. Beyond opposition to difference Inside the political, democracy and parrhesia could be made to work together as the simultaneous manifestation of contingency and necessity; but only if we can transcend the mal adjustment of the democracy of equals and the ascendancy of parrhesia that the politics of exception expresses. This either turns the citizens into a superpower of dissensus and rupture or includes the parrhesiast as one more alterity in the community of equals ‘constituted through polemicizing over the common’ (Rancière 2010: 104). In any case, the result is that ‘the game of democracy and of truth-telling, do not manage to combine and suitably adjust to each other in a way which will enable this democracy to survive’ (GSO: 181). Rather, it insulates the political authorities from the political community with which they are endogenously connected as parties to a political authority relationship that requires the commons’ acceptance and recognition in order for it to continue in, and through, history. Political authority is constitutively open to exception made by political authorities or laypeople in their political communities. However, a minimal degree of cooperation between them is required for their continuous restructuring of their political regime and their relevant nonpolitical contexts – sometimes in the face of violent ruptures, difficult struggles and high-consequence risks (Bang 2009a, b, 2014). Obviously, if self-governance and co-governance are to become the basis of political community, then parrhesiast political authorities are required who can see the truth, are capable of telling it, are devoted to the pursuit of common concerns, and are generally reliable, honest and incorruptible. However, this is not the signature of hegemony, but the sign of a political authority with integrity that decides and acts (GSO: 178) on the basis of a democratic structure, a legitimate ascendancy exercised through a true discourse, and [as someone] with the courage to assert this true discourse. Thus, Foucault’s political analysis of government by truth is not founded on any claim to the primacy of either conflict or consensus, and does not give priority to either the political authority or the political community. In fact, the conception of the good political parrhesia moves political analysis beyond all rulers–ruled oppositions. It compels political researchers to conduct their analysis in light of the possibility that a good cooperative circle of political communication and interaction between political authorities and laypeople could be made to occur, if only both parties to the authority relationship would accept and recognize the real and necessary political difference between the interdependent logics of politeia and parrhesia . Hence, to critique modernity in Foucault’s manner is not equivalent to identifying the political with an extraordinary decision, which then is coercively imposed on people. Nor does it compel us to conclude that the circle of political authority and political community merely expresses the political construction of ‘a paradoxical world that puts together two separable worlds’ (Rancière 2010: 39). That only becomes the case if acceptance and recognition of political authority is equated with a forced compliance induced through disciplinary subjection and policing. Then, evidently, the ethical life among equals inside political communities will appear as always and intrinsically opposed to political authorities’ world of lived necessity. The virtue of being a political lay actor in a democratic political community is not just that one can act without a command, ‘ as if a command was not needed’ (Bauman 1995: 59, my italics). It is, rather, to know that a command/obedience relation is not necessary for cooperating with political authorities in the articulation and performance of common concerns. What is needed is merely the acceptance and recognition of the difference between being a political authority and a lay member of a political community. Placing political cooperation before consensus and dissensus The duality of political authority and political community comes out clearly in Foucault’s specification of the difference between parrhesia and democracy (GSO: 183–184): Not everybody can tell the truth just because everybody may speak. True discourse introduces a difference or rather is linked, both in its conditions and its effects, to a difference: only a few can tell the truth. And once only a few can tell the truth, once this truth-telling has emerged into the field of democracy, a difference is produced which is that of the ascendancy exercised by some over others. True discourse and the emergence of true discourse underpins the process of governmentality. If democracy can be governed, it is because there is a true discourse. Does this signify that Foucault, after all, is speaking of parrhesia as power over others? Well, some would probably say he is, but I think he is not, at least not in the normal sense of domination as class power or symbolic violence, manifesting a conflict of interest or meaning in which resistance is repressed and wills are subdued by the stronger class or superior will to knowledge (Bourdieu 1992, Devine and Savage 2005, Lukes 2005, Poulantzas 1975). We must remember that the good parrhesia grows out of democracy in the authority relationship, and, therefore, that the authority relationship between authorities and laypeople, in the ‘original position’, must be functional before it can, for example, take shape as a command/obedience relationship. To stress the importance of ascendancy for the good political parrhesia is not the same as claiming that politics will always be dominated by circulating power elites or classes. As distinct from elitists like Michels, Mosca and Pareto, Foucault does not classify people inside the political according to the power and control they actually hold. He merely wishes to point out the difference between those few who are the occupants of the political authority roles and the many ‘ordinary’ members who are not. This may also be why he himself, in the end, felt compelled to make an explicit distinction between power and domination, as in this interview from 1982 (FL 1996 : 417): Domination is a particular case within the different possibility of power relations. You can have a power relation without this type of domination. But what makes me uncomfortable with these analyses – at least those by Habermas – is the fact that when he speaks about power, he always understands it as domination. And he translates ‘power’ by ‘domination.’ To exercise political ascendancy is not the same as exercising command and control over others. Political authorities need not be coextensive with the politically relevant members; nor do they have to be driven by the goal of appropriating power above all else (cf. Easton 1965b: 214–215). Furthermore, however little actual control laypeople may possess under given circumstances, it is still necessary for them to systematically articulate and perform policies that most people will accept and recognize as binding, at least most of the time. However, the point is that some basic faculties are required to be in a position to exercise good political parrhesia . You cannot just walk in from the street and do so. Special political competences are required, developed from day-to-day experiences with the risks, problems and challenges that have to be dealt with in, and through, systematic political decision and action. Political authorities may sometimes function as puppets for certain dominant socioeconomic interests or identities. Yet, no matter how little actual control they possess, they are still directly and immediately responsible for how policies are authoritatively formulated, programmed, ‘packaged’ and carried out for society and the population in day-to-day political life. Likewise, laypeople in their political communities may be downtrodden by a totalitarian or authoritarian regime and hindered in all ways from exercising their creative political capacity to affect the production of political outcomes. Nevertheless, not even the most totalitarian regime can afford to ignore the political fact that it could not exist for a moment if laypeople suddenly refused to accept and recognize themselves as bound by authority, for whatever combination of reasons. The Eastern European and Chinese revolutions should at least have taught us that much. What we should emphasize much more today is the possibility of introducing the model of good parrhesia as an alternative to the models of the extraordinary decision-maker and the ordinary exception. What laypeople do in their political communities is not reducible to a matter of repoliticizing what has been depoliticized by the police. It is not merely this notion of democracy as dispute and struggle that is intrinsic to understanding what political community is all about. It is, more than anything else, the ability of laypeople to continuously problematize how policies are articulated and performed in time-space. Whereas politicization is tied to the logic of dissensus and consensus, problematization is connected with the logic of accepting and rejecting. Where problematization is continuous, politicization is discontinuous. Thus, problematization provides ‘ordinary people’ inside their political communities with a much more long-lasting and general political significance and relevance than is possible in politicization. It makes the never-ceasing spontaneity and creativity of ordinary citizens the ground for developing the politics of truth of the parrhesiast, by igniting and keeping the political authority responsive to conducting the circle of the good parrhesia.

#### Structural separations preserve democratic governance by challenging the structures that produce economic concentration.

Khan ’20 [Lina, Chairperson @ Federal Trade Commission, JD @ Yale Law School; “The End of Antitrust History Revisited,” *Harvard Law Review* 133(5), p. 1655-1683; AS]

I. THE CURSE OF BIGNESS

Wu's The Curse of Bigness is structured around three key tenets: (i) that antitrust and antimonopoly are central to America's political tradition and critical safeguards of a democratic republic (pp. 16-19); (2) that the structure of our economy inextricably shapes our experience as citizens (pp. 39-44); and (3) that the decades-long project to defang antitrust is the product of an intellectual revolution that redefined how we assess competition through adopting "consumer welfare" as the law's only goal (pp. 88-91, 135).

First, Wu makes clear that his aim is to help recenter antitrust as a key “check on private power as necessary in a functioning democracy” (p. 19). Revisiting the legislative history of antitrust, he notes that lawmakers passed antitrust laws with the expressly political goal of preventing economic autocracy and prohibiting coercive conduct (pp. 30– 31).14 He analogizes antitrust to constitutional law, both in function and in import, following a tradition of scholars who have explored what it means for antitrust to serve a constitutional role (p. 54).15 Wu draws out two distinct aspects of this constitutional dimension. He argues that the passage of the antitrust laws reflected a “[c]onstitutional choice in industrial and national policy,” suggesting that lawmakers passed antitrust laws in order to codify a set of foundational principles that were to set the backdrop of American life (p. 17). Analogizing antitrust to the checks and balances of the U.S. constitutional system, Wu also underscores how constitutional design and antitrust law both reflect a distrust of concentrated power (p. 31). The steady erosion of antitrust, then, is a threat not just to open markets and fair competition, but to the basis of democratic governance.

Second, Wu makes the case that economic concentration inextricably shapes our experience as citizens and that how we structure our markets is foremost a political question that demands critical public engagement (p. 33).16 This tenet is most directly an echo of Justice Brandeis, whose 1934 book is a namesake for Wu’s.17 Justice Brandeis analyzed the phenomenology of concentrated private power, examining how living in a nation of monopolies and oligopolies — being subject to their whims and arbitrary dictates — shaped the experience of civic life.18 Wu, channeling Justice Brandeis, answers that it leads to “a certain inhumanity,” likely to both “rob the American people of their character” and “suppress[] industrial liberty” (p. 41).19 The analysis focuses on how having one’s life largely governed by unaccountable private power tends to undermine liberty and self-determination. “We like to speak of freedoms in the abstract, but for most people, a sense of autonomy is more influenced by private forces and economic structure than by government” (p. 40), Wu writes, explaining that Justice Brandeis viewed “real freedom as freedom from both public and private coercion” (p. 41). The threat to liberty posed by monopoly — which can be understood as a form of private sovereign — remains a “major blind spot for contemporary libertarianism, which is rightly concerned with government overreach but bizarrely tolerant of mistreatment or abuse committed by so-called private actors” (p. 41 n.\*).20

A striking corollary to the idea that extreme economic concentration undermines personal and political liberty is that it can also facilitate the rise of fascism. A major current underlying Wu’s book is that failing to police the growth and incursion of extreme concentrations of private power will not just come at the expense of certain republican ideals but, instead, threatens democracy altogether (p. 139). Wu argues that the German Republic’s acceptance of monopolies and concentrated industry in key markets helped give rise to Hitler, and that the mid-century push for reviving antitrust in the United States was driven, in part, by fears that — absent intervention — America, too, could fall subject to the same fate (pp. 79–82).21 In the lead-up to the passage of the Anti-Merger Act of 1950, both of the bill’s chief sponsors discussed how halting the rising tide of economic concentration was critical for avoiding totalitarianism.22

Third, Wu pegs the enfeebling of antitrust to an intellectual shift ushered in by the Chicago School (pp. 83-92). The Chicago School began with a group of economists and lawyers primarily associated with the University of Chicago (pp. 84-85). Its key founders included Professors Aaron Director, Milton Friedman, and George Stigler and the group grew to include figures such as Professor Ward Bowman and then-Professors Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, and Robert Bork (pp. 84-85). Backed by money from the Volker Fund, the group established a project to "promote private enterprise."123 Their scholarship applied neoclassical price theory to the study of legal rules and, in particular, to the analysis of antitrust.24 Under the guidance of Director, students and researchers studied various antitrust doctrines through the lens of price theory, criticizing prevailing case law and theories of harm.25 Perhaps the "most influential" of these efforts, Wu notes, was Bork's paper revisiting the legislative history of the Sherman Act and concluding that the sole purpose of the antitrust laws was to maximize consumer welfare (p. 88). Although a long list of scholars would subsequently debunk Bork's claim,26 the Supreme Court adopted Bork's fictitious account.2 7

The embrace of consumer welfare by courts and enforcers alike "threw out the broader concerns that had long animated the [Sherman] Act and its enforcement" (p. 89). Under the new paradigm, harm to competition would manifest solely as harm to allocative efficiency in the form of higher prices or lower output. Wu observes that Chicago's framework pledged economic rigor yet neglected to consider a host of economic costs, including stagnation and stunted innovation (p. 90). "In truth," Wu writes, "Robert Bork's attack on antitrust was really laissezfaire reincarnated" (p. 91). With the codification of Chicago's ideas, antitrust "lost its traditional goals" (p. 103).

Several factors enabled ideas once considered "lunatic fringe" 28 to redefine antitrust. Channeling the work of Professor William Kovacic, Wu notes that Chicago's triumph relied on key concessions from and alliances with the Harvard School, comprised of centrist scholars and enforcers such as Professors Donald Turner and Phil Areeda and thenJudge Stephen Breyer (p. 103).29 Kovacic's analysis focuses on how the institutional concerns that occupied Harvard School thinkers (such as their misgivings about expansive private rights of action under the U.S. antitrust system) led them to embrace some of the same prescriptions as Chicago. 30 Wu adds that these scholars were also haunted by critiques that antitrust enforcement had become arbitrary and unjustifiably aggressive, nothing short of "the blind firing of muskets at companies that just seemed bad" (p. 103). Meanwhile price theory, along with the consumer welfare standard, appeared to promise a disciplined and rigorous approach to enforcement. A decades-long attack by Chicago on the existing paradigm had left Harvard School academics more susceptible to - and perhaps less critical of - Chicago's interventions (p. 105). As the ideological makeup of the federal judiciary shifted, courts adopted Chicago's theories much more readily.

Within a decade the Chicago movement began encountering some resistance from what is referred to as the "Post-Chicago School," a group of economists and lawyers that "emerged to challenge many of [Chicago's] basic premises" (p. 107). Whereas Chicago scholars had introduced general theories, Post-Chicago academics sought to qualify them, circumscribing the set of conditions under which Chicago's predictions would hold. Yet despite their interventions, "the antimonopoly provisions of the Sherman Act went into a deep freeze from which they have never really recovered" (p. 108). Our economy today reflects this neglect, with highly concentrated product and labor markets along with a tech industry that, while once open and dynamic, is increasingly closed and controlled (pp. 114-26).

Wu closes by sketching the outlines of a Neo-Brandeisian agenda that would resuscitate antitrust. He recommends a merger enforcement program that would fulfill Congress's mandate to arrest mergers even when concentration is in its incipiency, and he proposes that antitrust agencies open up merger review to greater public scrutiny and accountability (pp. 127-30). He urges a return to the "big case" tradition that targeted AT&T and Microsoft (pp. 93-101), and implores enforcers to recover corporate breakups as a mainstay antitrust remedy, observing that the administrative difficulty of structural remedies is often overstated and the benefits (including the "self-executing" nature of breakups) underappreciated (pp. 132-33). Finally, Wu calls for antitrust to abandon consumer welfare as its stated goal and return to a "protection of competition" test, which is more faithful to legislative history and earlier precedent (pp. 135-37). Building on scholarship by Professors Barak Orbach and Eleanor Fox, 31 among others, Wu observes that the goal of preserving competition is "focused on protection of a process," whereas promoting consumer welfare prioritizes "the maximization of a value" (p. 136). Refocusing antitrust on protecting the competitive process, Wu argues, would bring enforcement more in line with actual business realities while also reflecting congressional intent.

#### Liberalism is not a monolith – retrieving it for a radical democratic agenda challenges unjust hierarchies of domination.

Charles W. **MILLS** Professor of Philosophy @ CUNY **’12** “Occupy Liberalism,” Chapter 2 in *Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism* [h](https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190245412.001.0001/acprof-9780190245412-chapter-2)

The “Occupy Wall Street!” movement stimulated a long listing of other candidates for radical “occupation.” This chapter proposes as a target for radical occupation the somewhat unusual candidate of liberalism itself. It argues for a constructive engagement of radicals with liberalism in order to retrieve it for a radical egalitarian agenda. The premise is that the foundational values of liberalism have a radical potential that has not historically been realized, given the way the dominant varieties of liberalism have developed. Ten reasons standardly given as to why such a retrieval cannot be carried out are examined and argued to be fallacious.

The “Occupy!” movement, which has made headlines around the country, has raised the hopes of young American radicals new to political engagement and revived the hopes of an older generation of radicals still clinging to nostalgic dreams of the glorious ’60s. If the original and still most salient target was Wall Street, a long list of other candidates for “occupation” has since been put forward. In this chapter, I want to propose as a target for radical occupation the somewhat unusual candidate of liberalism itself. But contrary to the conventional wisdom prevailing within radical circles, I am going to argue for the heretical thesis that liberalism should not be contemptuously rejected by radicals but retrieved for a radical agenda. Summarized in bullet-point form, my argument is as follows:

• The “Occupy Wall Street” movement provides an opportunity unprecedented in decades to build a broad democratic movement to challenge plutocracy, patriarchy, and white supremacy in the United States.

• Such a movement is more likely to be successful if it appeals to principles and values most Americans already endorse.

• Liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the United States.

• Liberalism in the United States has historically been complicit with plutocracy, patriarchy, and white supremacy, but this complicity is a contingent function of dominant group interests rather than the result of an immanent conceptual logic.

• Therefore, progressives in philosophy (and elsewhere) should try to retrieve liberalism for a radical democratic agenda rather than rejecting it, thereby positioning themselves in the ideological mainstream of the country and seeking its transformation.

Let me now try to make this argument plausible for an audience likely to be aprioristically convinced of its obvious unsoundness.

Preliminary Clarification of Terms

First we need to clarify the key terms of “radicalism” and “liberalism.” While of course a radicalism of the right exists, here I refer to radicals who are progressives. But “progressive” cannot just denote the left of the political spectrum, since the whole point of the “new social movements” of the 1960s onward was that the traditional left-right political spectrum, predicated on varying positions on the question of public versus private ownership of the means of production, did not exhaust the topography of the political. Issues of gender and racial domination were to a significant extent “orthogonal” to this one-dimensional trope. So I will use “radicalism” broadly, though still in the zone of progressive politics, to refer generally to ideas/concepts/principles/values endorsing pro-egalitarian structural change to reduce or eliminate unjust hierarchies of domination.

“Liberalism” may denote both a political philosophy and the institutions and practices characteristically tied to that political philosophy. My focus will be on the former. The issue of how bureaucratic logics may prove refractory to reformist agendas is undeniably an important one, but it does not really fall into the purview of philosophy proper. My aim is to challenge the radical shibboleth that radical ideas/concepts/principles/values are incompatible with liberalism. Given the deep entrenchment of this assumption in the worldview of most radicals, refuting it would still be an accomplishment, even if working out practical details of operationalization are delegated to other hands.

In the United States, of course, “liberalism” in public parlance and everyday political discourse is used in such a way that it really denotes left-liberalism specifically (“left” by the standards of a country whose political center of gravity has shifted right in recent decades). In this vocabulary, right-liberals are then categorized as “conservatives”—in the market sense, as against the Burkean sense. On the other hand, some on the right would insist that only they, the heirs to the classic liberalism of John Locke and Adam Smith, are really entitled to the “liberal” designation. Later welfarist theorists are fraudulent pretenders to be exposed as socialist intruders unworthy of the title. Rejecting both of these usages, I will be employing “liberalism” in the expanded sense typical of political philosophy, which links both ends of this spectrum. “Liberalism” then refers broadly to the (p.12) anti-feudal ideology of individualism, equal rights, and moral egalitarianism that arises in Western Europe in the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries to challenge the ideas and values inherited from the old medieval order, and which is subsequently taken up and developed by others elsewhere, including many who would have been explicitly excluded by the original conception of the ideology. Left-wing social democrats and right-wing market conservatives, fans of John Rawls on the one hand and Robert Nozick on the other, are thus both liberals.1

From this perspective, it will be appreciated that liberalism is not a monolith but an umbrella term for a variety of positions. Here are some examples—some familiar, some perhaps less so:

Varieties of Liberalism

Left-wing (social democratic) vs. Right-wing (market conservative)

Kantian vs. Lockean

Contractarian vs. Utilitarian

Corporate vs. Democratic

Social vs. Individualist

Comprehensive vs. Political

Ideal-theory vs. Non-ideal-theory

Patriarchal vs. Feminist

Imperial vs. Anti-imperial

Racial vs. Anti-racial

Color-blind vs. Color-conscious

Etc.2

It is not the case, of course, that these different species of liberalism have been equally represented in the ideational sphere or equally implemented in the institutional sphere. On the contrary, some have been dominant while others have been subordinate, and some have never, at least in the full sense, been implemented at all. But nonetheless, I suggest they all count as liberalisms and as such they are all supposed to have certain elements in common, even those characterized by gender and racial exclusions. (My motivation for making these last varieties of liberalism rather than deviations from liberalism is precisely to challenge liberalism’s self-congratulatory history, which holds an idealized liberalism aloft, untainted by its actual record of complicity with oppressive social systems.) So the initial question we should always ask people making generalizations about “liberalism” is this: What particular variety of liberalism do you mean? And are your generalizations really true about all the possible kinds of liberalism, or only a subset? (p.13)

Here is a characterization of liberalism from a very respectable source, the British political theorist, John Gray:

Common to all variants of the liberal tradition is a definite conception, distinctively modern in character, of man and society… . It is individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against the claims of any social collectivity; egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on all men the same moral status and denies the relevance to legal or political order of differences in moral worth among human beings; universalist, affirming the moral unity of the human species and according a secondary importance to specific historic associations and cultural forms; and meliorist in its affirmation of the corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and political arrangements. It is this conception of man and society which gives liberalism a definite identity which transcends its vast internal variety and complexity.3

What generate the different varieties of liberalism are different concepts of individualism, different claims about how egalitarianism should be construed or realized, more or less inclusionary readings of universalism (Gray’s characterization sanitizes liberalism’s actual sexist and racist history), different views of what count as desirable improvements, conflicting normative balancings of liberal values (freedom, equality) and competing theoretical prognoses about how best they can be realized in the light of (contested) socio-historical facts. The huge potential for disagreement about all of these explains how a common liberal core can produce such a wide range of variants. Moreover, we need to take into account not merely the spectrum of actual liberalisms but also hypothetical liberalisms that could be generated through novel framings of some or all of the above. So one would need to differentiate dominant versions of liberalism from oppositional versions, and actual from possible variants.

Once the breadth of the range of liberalisms is appreciated—dominant and subordinate, actual and potential—the obvious question then raised is this: even if actual dominant liberalisms have been conservative in various ways (corporate, patriarchal, racist) why does this rule out the development of emancipatory, radical liberalisms?

One kind of answer is the following (call this the internalist answer): because there is an immanent conceptual/normative logic to liberalism as a political ideology that precludes any emancipatory development of it.

Another kind of answer is the following (call this the externalist answer): it doesn’t. The historic domination of conservative exclusionary liberalisms is the result of group interests, group power, and successful group political projects. Apparent internal conceptual/normative barriers to an emancipatory liberalism can be successfully negotiated by drawing (p.14) on the conceptual/normative resources of liberalism itself, in conjunction with a revisionist socio-historical picture of modernity.

Most self-described radicals would endorse—indeed, reflexively, as an obvious truth—the first answer. But as indicated from the beginning, I think the second answer is actually the correct one. The obstacles to developing a “radical liberalism” are, in my opinion, primarily externalist in nature: material group interests, and the way they have shaped hegemonic varieties of liberalism. So I think we need to try to justify a radical agenda with the normative resources of liberalism rather than writing off liberalism. Since liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the United States and is now globally hegemonic, such a project would have the great ideological advantage of appealing to values and principles that most people already endorse. All projects of egalitarian social transformation are going to face a combination of material, political, and ideological obstacles, but this strategy would at least reduce somewhat the dimensions of the last. One would be trying to win mass support for policies that—and the challenge will, of course, be to demonstrate this—are justifiable by majoritarian norms, once reconceived and put in conjunction with facts not always familiar to the majority. Material barriers (vested group interests) and political barriers (organizational difficulties) will of course remain. But they will constitute a general obstacle for all egalitarian political programs, and as such cannot be claimed to be peculiar problems for an emancipatory liberalism.

But the contention will be that such a liberalism cannot be developed. Why? Here are ten familiar objections, variants of internalism, and my replies to them.

Ten Reasons Why Liberalism Cannot Be Radicalized (And My Replies)

1. Liberalism Has an Asocial, Atomic Individualist Ontology

This is one of the oldest radical critiques of liberalism; it can be found in Marx’s derisive comments—for example, in the Grundrisse—about the “Robinsonades” of the social contract theory whose “golden age” (1650–1800) had long passed by the time he began his intellectual and political career:

The individual and isolated hunter or fisher who forms the starting-point with Smith and Ricardo belongs to the insipid illusions of the eighteenth century. They are Robinson Crusoe stories … no more based on such a naturalism than is Rousseau’s contrat social which makes naturally independent individuals come in contact and have (p.15) mutual intercourse by contract… . Man is in the most literal sense of the word a zoon politikon, not only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society. Production by individuals outside society … is as great an absurdity as the idea of the development of language without individuals living together and talking to one another.4

But several replies can be made to this indictment. To begin with, even if the accusation is true of contractarian liberalism, not all liberalisms are contractarian. Utilitarian liberalism rests on different theoretical foundations, as does the late nineteenth-century British liberalism of T. H. Green and his colleagues: a Hegelian, social liberalism.5 Closer to home, of course, we have John Dewey’s brand of liberalism. Moreover, even within the social contract tradition, resources exist for contesting the assumptions of the Hobbesian/Lockean version of the contract. Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (1755) (nowhere cited by Marx) rethinks the “contract” to make it a contract entered into after the formation of society, and thus the creation of socialized human beings. So the ontology presupposed is explicitly a social one. In any case, the contemporary revival of contractarianism initiated by John Rawls’s 1971 A Theory of Justice makes the contract a thought-experiment, a “device of representation,” rather than a literal or even metaphorical anthropological account.6 The communitarian/contractarian debates of the 1980s onward recapitulated much of the “asocial” critique of contractarian liberalism (though usually without a radical edge). But as Rawls pointed out against Michael Sandel, for example, one needs to distinguish the figures in the thought-experiment from real human beings.7 And radicals should be wary about accepting a communitarian ontology and claims about the general good that deny or marginalize the dynamics of group domination in actual societies represented as “communities.” The great virtue of contractarian liberal individualism is the conceptual room it provides for hegemonic norms to be critically evaluated through the epistemic and moral distancing from Sittlichkeit that the contract, as an intellectual device, provides.

2. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology—I (Macro)

The second point needs to be logically distinguished from the first, since a theory could acknowledge the social shaping of individuals while denying that group oppression is central to that shaping. (So #1 is necessary, but not sufficient, for #2.) The Marxist critique, of course, was supposed to encapsulate both points: people were shaped by society and society (post-“primitive (p.16) communism”) was class dominated. The ontology was social and it was an ontology of class. Today radicals would demand a richer ontology that can accommodate the realities of gender and racial oppression also. But whatever candidates are put forward, the key claim is that a liberal framework cannot accommodate an ontology of groups in relations of domination and subordination. To the extent that liberalism recognizes social groups, these are basically conceived of as voluntary associations that one chooses to join or not join, which is obviously very different from, say, class, race, and gender memberships.

But this evasive ontology, which obfuscates the most central and obvious fact about all societies since humanity exited the hunting-and-gathering stage—that is, that they are characterized by oppressions of one kind or another—is not a definitional constituent of liberalism. Liberalism has certainly recognized some kinds of oppression: the absolutism it opposed from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, the Nazism and Stalinism it opposed in the twentieth century. Liberalism’s failure to systematically address structural oppression in supposedly liberal-democratic societies is a contingent artifact of the group perspectives and group interests privileged by those structures, not an intrinsic feature of liberalism’s conceptual apparatus.

In the preface to her recent Analyzing Oppression, Ann Cudd makes a striking point: that hers is the first book-length treatment of the subject in the analytic tradition.8 Philosophy, the discipline whose special mandate it is to illuminate justice and injustice for us, has had very little to say about injustice and oppression because of the social background of the majority of its thinkers. In political theory and political philosophy, the theorists who developed the dominant varieties of liberalism have come overwhelmingly from the hegemonic groups of the liberal social order (bourgeois white males). So it is really not surprising that, given this background, their socio-political and epistemic standpoint has tended to reproduce rather than challenge group privilege.

Consider Rawls, famously weak on gender and with next to nothing to say about race. Rawlsian “ideal theory,” which has dominated mainstream political philosophy for the last four decades, marginalizes such concerns not contingently but structurally. If your focus from the start is principles of distributive justice for a “well-ordered society,” then social oppression cannot be part of the picture, since by definition an oppressive society is not a well-ordered one. As Cudd points out, A Theory of Justice “leaves injustice virtually untheorized,” operating on the assumption “that injustice is merely the negation of justice.”9 But radically unjust societies—those characterized by major rather than minor deviations from ideality—will be different from just societies not merely morally but (p.17) also metaphysically. What Cudd calls “nonvoluntary social groups” will be central to their makeup.

Accordingly, Cudd contends that a conceptualization of “nonvoluntary social groups” must be central to any adequate account of social oppression: “without positing social groups as causally efficacious entities, we cannot explain oppression.” Contra the conventional wisdom in radical circles, however, she is insistent that the ontology of such groups can be explained “[using] current social science, in the form of cognitive psychology and modern economic theory, and situat[ing] itself in the Anglo-American tradition of liberal political philosophy.”10 Identifying “intentionalist” and “structuralist” approaches as the two broad categories of competing theorizations of social groups, she recommends as the best option a compatibilist position, holding that while all action is intentionally guided, many of the constraints within which we act are socially determined and beyond the control of the currently acting individual; to put a slogan on it, intentions dynamically interact within social structures… . My theory of nonvoluntary social groups fits the description of what Philip Pettit calls “holistic individualism,” which means that the social regularities associated with nonvoluntary social groups supervene on intentional states, and at the same time, group membership in these and voluntary social groups partly constitutes the intentional states of individuals.11

If Cudd is right, then, such a theorization can indeed be developed within a liberal framework, using the resources of analytic social and normative theory. But such a development of the theory is not merely permissible but should be seen as mandatory, given liberalism’s nominal commitment to individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, and meliorism. These values simply cannot be achieved unless the obstacles to their realization are identified and theorized. Social-democratic (left) liberalism, feminist liberalism, black liberalism all historically represent attempts to take these structural realities into account for the purposes of rethinking dominant liberalism.12 They are attempts to get right, to map accurately, the actual ontology of the societies for which liberalism is prescribing principles of justice. What Cudd’s book demonstrates is that it is the ignoring of this ontology of group domination that is the real betrayal of the liberal project. A well-ordered society will not have nonvoluntary social groups as part of its ontology. So the path to the “realistic utopia” Rawls is supposedly outlining would crucially require normative prescriptions for eliminating such groups. That no such guidelines are offered is undeniably an indictment of ideal-theory liberalism, which is thereby exposed as both epistemologically and ontologically inadequate. But that does not rule out a reconceptualized (p.18) liberalism, a non-ideal-theory liberalism that, starting from a different social metaphysic, requires a different normative strategy for theorizing justice.

3. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology—II (Micro)

But (it will be replied) liberalism suffers from a deeper theoretical inadequacy. Even if it may be conceded that liberal theory can recognize oppression at the macro-level, it will be argued that its individualism prevents it from recognizing how profoundly, at the micro-level, individuals are shaped by structures of social oppression. Class, race, and gender belongings penetrate deeply into the ontology of the individual in ways rendered opaque (it will be claimed) by liberalism’s foundational individualism.

But what those seeking to retrieve liberalism would point out is that we need to distinguish different senses of “individualism.” The individualism that is foundational to liberalism is a normative individualism (as in the Gray quote above), which makes individuals rather than social collectivities the locus of value. But that does not require any denial that individuals are shaped in their character (the “second nature” famously highlighted by left theory) by oppressive social forces and related group memberships. Once the first two criticisms have been refuted—that liberal individuals cannot be “social,” and that the involuntary group memberships central to the social in oppressive societies cannot be accommodated within a liberal framework—then this third criticism collapses also. One can without inconsistency affirm both the value of the individual and the importance of recognizing how the individual is socially molded, especially when the environing social structures are oppressive ones. As already noted, dominant liberalism tends to ignore or marginalize such constraints, assuming as its representative figures individuals not merely morally equal, but socially recognized as morally equal, and equi-powerful rather than group-differentiated into the privileged and the subordinated. But this misleading normative and descriptive picture is a function of a political agenda complicit with the status quo, not a necessary implication of liberalism’s core assumptions. A revisionist, radical liberalism would make the analysis of group oppression, the denial of equal standing to the majority of the population, and their impact on the individual’s ontology, a theoretical priority. Thus Cudd’s book, after explicating the ontology of involuntary groups, goes on to detail the various different ways—through violence, economic constraint, discrimination, group harassment, and the internalization of psychological oppression—that the subordinated are shaped by group domination.13 But nothing in her account is meant to imply either that they (p.19) thereby cease to be individuals or that their involuntary group memberships preclude a normative liberal condemnation of the injustice of their treatment.

4. Liberal Humanist Individualism Is Naïve about the Subject

A different kind of challenge is mounted by Foucault (though arguably originating in such earlier sources as the “anti-humanism” of Althusserian Marxism).14 Here, as John Christman points out, in contrast to the “thick” conception of the person advocated by communitarianism, in critique of liberalism, we get the theoretical recommendation that “the notion of a singular unified subject of any sort, however thin the conception, [must be] abandoned.”15 As Foucault writes:

How, under what conditions, and in what forms can something like a subject appear in the order of discourse? What place can it occupy in each type of discourse, what functions can it assume, and by obeying what rules? In short, it is a matter of depriving the subject (or its substitute) of its role as originator, and of analyzing the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse.16

The subject is not merely molded by power, but produced by power, and, in effect, vanishes.

I agree that liberalism cannot meet such a challenge, but I think the premise of the challenge should be rejected. Here I am in sympathy with Christman, who, reviewing various critiques of the classic liberal humanist conception of the self, argues for a socio-historical conception that concedes the absurdity of the notion of people springing from their own brow (“originators”) while nonetheless making a case for “degrees” of self-creation:

Selves should be seen as to a large extent formed by factors not under the control of those reflective agents themselves… . This will help accomplish two things: to provide grounds for the rejection of models of agency and citizenship that assume Herculean abilities to fashion ourselves out of whole cloth; and to force us to focus more carefully on what powers of self-shaping we therefore are left with… . The point must be that the role of the self’s control of the self (and the attendant social elements of both ‘selves’) will be circumscribed by the ways in which our lives are shaped for us and not by us.17

A commitment to humanism does not, as pointed out above, require the denial of the obvious fact that human beings—especially the (p.20) oppressed—are constrained by material structures and social restrictions in what they can accomplish, nor that, as products of particular epochs and group memberships, their consciousness will have been shaped by dominant concepts and norms. Marx emphasized long ago that though people make history, they do not make it under conditions of their own choosing, that agency is constrained by structure and circumstance. But, contra Althusser, this was never intended as a rejection of the claim that it is still people who ultimately assert their personhood in struggle.

And in my opinion, the retort applies to the Foucauldian version of the thesis also. To make the familiar left critiques: such an analysis not only deprives us of a normative basis for indicting structures of oppression, not only deprives the subject of agency, but is flagrantly inconsistent with the actual history of people’s resistance to the systems that have supposedly “produced” them as subjects. The anti-colonial struggle, the anti-Fascist and anti-Stalinist struggles, the civil rights struggles of white women, people of color, gays, the recent “Arab spring” all give the lie to such a diagnosis. Radical liberalism is capable of recognizing both the extent of our socialization by the existing oppressive social order and the ways in which, nonetheless, many people resist and struggle against this oppressive social order.

5. Liberalism’s Values (Independently of the Ontology Question) Are Themselves Problematic

Even if the ontological challenge can be beaten back, though, another front remains open. It will be argued that liberal humanist values are themselves problematic in nature and incapable of advancing a radical agenda. But the obvious reply is, Which values? And what exactly is the problem supposed to be: (a) that the values are intrinsically problematic? (b) that the values involved have historically been extended in an exclusionary discriminatory way? (c) that the values have been developed in a fashion that is predicated on the experience of the privileged? These are all different claims.

Start with the first. Admittedly, some values associated with the liberal tradition could be judged to be intrinsically problematic, such as the “possessive individualism” C. B. Macpherson famously attributed to Hobbes and Locke.18 But this is a value specific to right-wing liberalism, not liberalism in general (it does not appear on Gray’s list), and would be opposed by left-wing/social democratic liberalism. Such values as “freedom,” “equality” (moral egalitarianism), and “fraternity/sorority” classically emblematic of the liberal tradition have not usually been seen as problematic by radicals and have indeed been emblazoned on radical banners. Freedom from oppression, equal rights/equal pay/equal citizenship (“I AM A MAN”), (p.21) fraternity/sorority with the subordinated (“Am I not a man and a brother? Am I not a woman and a sister?”) have all served as values for progressive movements seeking social emancipation.

To be sure, it is a familiar point to radicals, if somewhat less so to the non-radical majority, that the population as a whole has not historically been recognized as deserving the protections of these norms, so that the opponents of emancipation have all too often themselves been liberals. Freedom has been construed as justifiably resting on the enslavement of some; equality has been restricted to those deemed worthy of it (i.e., those more equal than others); fraternity has been literal, an all-boys’ club. Domenico Losurdo’s recently translated Liberalism: A Counter-History provides a devastating exposé of “liberal thought [not] in its abstract purity, but liberalism, and hence the liberal movement and liberal society, in their concrete reality.” It is an illuminatingly sordid history of the ideology’s complicity with racial slavery, white working-class indentureship, colonialism and imperialism (“A ‘Master-Race Democracy’ on a Planetary Scale,” in one chapter’s title), and the conceptual connection between the Nazi “final solution” and Europe’s earlier extermination programs against indigenous peoples.19

Yet it is noteworthy that in his concluding pages, Losurdo still affirms the “merits and strong points of the intellectual tradition under examination.” His “counter-history” has been aimed at dispelling the “habitual hagiography” that surrounds liberalism, and the related “myth of the gradual, peaceful transition, on the basis of purely internal motivations and impulses, from liberalism to democracy, or from general enjoyment of negative liberty to an ever wider recognition of political rights.”20 In reality, he emphasizes, “the classics of the liberal tradition” were generally hostile to democracy; the “exclusion clauses” required “violent upheavals” to be overcome; progress was not linear but a matter of advances and retreats; external crisis often played a crucial role; and white working-class and black inclusion in the polity came at the cost of their participation in colonial wars against native peoples.21 Nonetheless, his final paragraph insists:

However difficult such an operation might be for those committed to overcoming liberalism’s exclusion clauses, to take up the legacy of this intellectual tradition is an absolutely unavoidable task… . [L]‌iberalism’s merits are too significant and too evident for it to be necessary to credit it with other, completely imaginary ones. Among the latter is the alleged spontaneous capacity for self-correction often attributed to it… . Only in opposition to [such] pervasive repressions and transfigurations is the book now ending presented as a “counter-history”: bidding farewell to hagiography is the precondition for landing on the firm ground of history.22

So for Losurdo one can accept the indictment of actual historic liberalism, and its failure to live up to its putative universalism, without going on to conclude either that liberalism must therefore be abandoned or that liberalism’s own internal dynamic will naturally correct itself. Rather, the appropriate conclusion is that liberalism can be retrieved, but that it will take political struggle to do so.

Finally, even when the “exclusion clauses” are formally overcome, their legacy may well remain in the form of values now nominally extended to everybody, but in reality articulated in such a fashion as to continue to reproduce group privilege—for example, a “freedom” that repudiates caste status but does not recognize illicit economic constraint as unfairly limiting liberty, or an “autonomy” that does not acknowledge the role of female caregiving in enabling human development, or a “justice” resolutely forward-looking that blocks issues of rectification of past injustices. But what such tendentious conceptual framings arguably call for is a critique and a rethinking of these values and principles in the light of these exclusions (as with left, feminist, and black liberalism). That does not refute their normative worth; it just underlines the necessity for taking the whole population into account in revising them and developing a blueprint of their internal architecture adequately sensitized to the differential social location and social history of such groups, particularly those traditionally oppressed.

6. Liberalism’s Enlightenment Origins Commit It to Seeing Moral Suasion and Rational Discourse as the Societal Prime Movers

Liberalism is often associated with a historical progressivism, but a belief in the possibility and desirability of meliorism (see Gray) certainly does not commit one to Whiggish teleologies. One can oppose conservative fatalism and pessimism in its different versions—Christian claims about original sin, Burkean distrust of abstract reason, biological determinism in its ever-changing and ever-renewed incarnations—without thinking that there is any inevitability about the triumph of progress and reason. A liberalism that is “radical” will necessarily need to draw on the left tradition’s demystified analysis of the centrality of group domination to the workings of the social order.23 As earlier noted (sections 2 and 3 above), a revisionist ontology that recognizes as key social players nonvoluntary social groups in structural relations of domination and subordination will perforce have a more realistic view of the (in)efficacy of moral suasion than an ontology of atomic individuals. (p.23)

Such a revisionist liberalism will acknowledge the role of hegemonic ideologies and vested group interests in the preservation of the status quo, and their refractoriness to appeals to reason and justice. Indeed, it will often be precisely in the names of a “reason” and “justice” shaped by the norms and perspectives of group privilege—of class, gender, and race—that egalitarian social change is resisted. As Losurdo makes clear, no immanent developmentalist moral dynamic drives liberalism’s evolution. It is not at all the case that an endorsement of democratized liberal norms implies any corollary belief that the democratic struggle for a more egalitarian social order is guaranteed to be successful. Progress is possible; defeat and rollback are also possible. In general, a radical liberalism should, in some sense, be “materialist,” recognizing the extent to which both people and the social dynamic are shaped by material forces and not over-estimating the causal role of rational argumentation and moral suasion on their own. Radical liberalism takes for granted that political and ideological struggle will be necessary to realize liberal values against the opposition of those who all too frequently think of themselves as the real liberals. Radical liberalism can be descriptively realist (realizing the centrality of interest-based politics) without being normatively realist (abandoning morality for realpolitik).

7. Liberalism Is Naïve in Assuming the Neutrality of the State and the Juridical System

Again, while such a claim may be true of dominant varieties of liberalism, it need not be true of all. (Note that nowhere in Gray’s characterization is any such assumption made.)

The neutrality of the juridico-political system is a liberal ideal, a norm to be striven for to reflect citizens’ equal moral status before the law and entitlement to equal protection of their legitimate interests. To represent it as a sociological generalization of liberal theory about actual political systems, including systems self-designated as liberal, would be to confuse the normative with the descriptive. Liberalism has certainly historically had no trouble in seeing the illicit influence of concentrated group power in the socio-political systems it opposed (see section #2). The original critique of “feudal” absolutism, the twentieth-century critique of “totalitarianism,” relied in part on the documentation and condemnation of the extent of legally backed state repression in curbing individual freedom. Liberalism’s blind spot has been its failure to document and condemn the enormity of the historic denial of equal rights to the majority of the population ruled by self-styled “liberal” states: the “absolutism” and “totalitarianism” directed against white women and white workers, and the nonwhite enslaved (p.24) and colonized. Patriarchal democracy, bourgeois democracy, Herrenvolk democracy have all been represented as “democracy” simpliciter, with no analysis of the mechanisms of structural subordination that have characterized such polities, or the ideological sleights-of-hand that have rationalized them. But to claim a necessary conceptual connection between such evasions and liberal assumptions is to confuse the contingent necessities of the discourse of hegemonic liberalism—aimed at preserving, whether by justifying or obfuscating, patriarchal, bourgeois, and racial power—with what is taken to be some kind of transworld essence of liberalism. In recent decades, a large body of literature has developed that investigates the impact of class, race, and gender dynamics in the actual functioning of the state and the legal system.24 Radical liberalism would draw on this body of literature in seeking to put in place the safeguards necessary for guaranteeing equal protection not merely on paper but in reality.

8. Liberalism Is Necessarily Anti-Socialist, So How “Radical” Could It Be?

“Socialism” is used in different senses. Assuming that a romanticized return to pre-industrial communal systems is not in the cards for a globalized world of seven-plus billion people, there are three main alternatives so far (two tried, one theorized about): state-commandist socialism, social democracy, market socialism. State-commandist socialism (a.k.a. “communism”) is indeed incompatible with liberalism but would seem to have been refuted as an attractive ideal by the history of the twentieth century.25 Social democracy is just left-liberalism, whether in Rawls’s version or in versions further left, like Brian Barry’s, more worried about the inequalities Rawls’s two principles of justice leave intact.26 Market socialism is yet to be implemented on a national level, but many of the hypothetical accounts of how it would work emphasize the importance of respecting liberal norms.27 In other words, market socialism’s putative superiority to capitalism is not defended by invoking distinctively socialist values but by showing how such uncontroversial and traditional liberal values as democracy, freedom, and self-realization are not going to be achievable for the majority under the present system (or through the appeal to more recent values like sustainability, generated by awareness of the impending ecological disaster, which the present order will make achievable for nobody!)28 Other possibilities are not ruled out, but their proponents would have to explain how their models have learned the lessons of the past in both (a) being economically viable and (b) respecting human rights, the common global moral currency of the postwar epoch, which is best developed in the liberal tradition. Criticism (p.25) of the existing order is not enough; one has to show how one’s proposed “socialist” alternative will be superior (and in more than a vague hand-waving kind of way).

9. The Discourse of Liberal Rights Cannot Accommodate Radical Redistribution and Structural Change

Marxism’s original critique of liberalism, apart from deriding its (imputed) social ontology, represented liberal rights—for example, in “On the Jewish Question”29—as a bourgeois concept. But that was more than a century and a half ago. Lockean rights-of-non-interference centered on private property, “negative” rights, are indeed deficient as an exclusivist characterization of people’s normative entitlements, but such a minimalist view has been contested by social democrats (some self-identifying as liberal) for more than a century. A significant literature now exists on “welfare” rights, “positive” rights, “social” rights, whose implementation would indeed require radical structural change. The legitimacy of these rights as “liberal” rights is, of course, denied by the political right. But that’s the whole point, with which I began—that liberalism is not a monolith but a set of competing interpretations and theorizations, fighting it out in a common arena.30 The US hostility to such rights is a manifestation of the historic success of conservatives in framing the normative agenda in this country, not a necessary corollary of liberalism as such. As earlier emphasized, liberalism must not be collapsed into neo-liberalism. Nor is it a refutation to point out that having such rights on paper does not guarantee their implementation, since this is just a variation of the already discussed imputation to liberalism of a necessarily idealist conception of the social dynamic (section #6), in which morality is a prime mover. But such a sociological claim is neither a foundational nor a derivative assumption of liberalism.

Moreover, in the specific case of the redress of racial injustice, one does not even need to appeal to such rights, since the situation of, for example, blacks in the United States is arguably the result of the historic and current violation of traditional negative rights (life, liberty, property), which are supposed to be the uncontroversial ones in the liberal tradition, as well as the legacy of such practices as manifest in illicitly accumulated wealth and opportunities. Here again the hegemony of Rawlsian “ideal theory” over the development of the mainstream political philosophy of the last forty years has had pernicious consequences, marginalizing such issues and putting the focus instead on principles of distributive justice for an ideal “well-ordered” society. But an emancipatory liberalism would be reoriented from (p.26) the start toward non-ideal theory and would correspondingly make rectificatory justice and the ending of social oppression its priority.31

10. American Liberalism in Particular Has Been so Shaped in Its Development by Race that Any Emancipatory Possibilities Have Been Foreclosed

Liberalism in general (both nationally and internationally) has been shaped by race, but that does not preclude reclaiming it.32 Moreover, it is precisely such shaping that motivates the imperative of recognizing the multiplicity of liberalisms, not merely for cataloging purposes but in order to frame them as theoretical objects whose dynamic requires investigation. The conflation of all liberalisms with their racialized versions obstructs seeing these ideologies as historically contingent varieties of liberalism, which could have developed otherwise. A Brechtian “defamiliarization” is necessary, a cognitive distancing that “denaturalizes” what is prone to appear as the essence of liberalism. Jennifer Pitts’s A Turn to Empire, for example, which is subtitled The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France, and Sankar Muthu’s Enlightenment against Empire, both seek to demarcate within liberalism the existence of anti- as well as pro-imperialist strains, thereby demonstrating that liberalism is not a monolith.33 Admittedly, other scholars have been more ambivalent about some of their supposed exemplars; see, for example, Losurdo, already cited, and John Hobson’s recent The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics, which develops a detailed and sophisticated taxonomy of varieties of Eurocentrism and imperialism that demonstrates the compatibility of racism, Eurocentrism, and anti-imperialism.34 (For instance, many European liberal theorists were anti-imperialist precisely because of their racism—their fears that the white race would degenerate as a result of miscegenation with inferior races and the deleterious consequences of prolonged residence in the unsuitable tropical climates of colonial outposts.) But the mere fact of such a range of positions illustrates that a liberalism neither Eurocentric nor imperialist is not a contradiction in terms.

In the United States in particular, as Rogers Smith has demonstrated, liberalism and racism have been intricately involved with one another from the nation’s inception, a relationship Smith conceptualizes in terms of conflicting “multiple traditions,” racism versus liberal universalism, and which I see as a conflict between “racial liberalism” and non-racial liberalism.35 My belief is that formally identifying “racial liberalism” as a particular evolutionary (and always evolving) ideological phenomenon better enables us to understand the role of race in writing and rewriting the most important political philosophy in the nation’s history, from the overtly racist liberalism (p.27) of the past to the nominally color-blind liberalism of the present. From the eighteenth- to nineteenth-century accommodation to racial slavery and aboriginal expropriation to the twentieth-century tainting of welfare and social democracy on this side of the Atlantic,36 race has refracted crucial terms, concepts, and values in liberal theory so as to remove any cognitive dissonance between the privileging of whites and the subordination of people of color. Correspondingly, the shaping of white moral psychology by race and the distinctive patterns of uptake of abstract liberal values (“equality,” “individualism”) in such a psychology then become legitimate objects of investigation for us.37 One begins from the assumption that these norms will be color-coded in their actual operationalization, so that any efficacious framing of an interracial political project will need to anticipate and correct for this differential understanding rather than being naively surprised by it. But such racialization (as popular interpretation and reception) is going to be a common problem for any American ideology with emancipatory pretensions. Liberalism is certainly not unique in that respect, as the history of the white American left and socialist movements illustrates. As Jack London famously put it at a meeting of the Socialist Party in San Francisco “when challenged by various members concerning his emphasis on the yellow peril”: “What the devil! I am first of all a white man and only then a Socialist!”38 Herrenvolk socialism existed no less than Herrenvolk liberalism.

#### Afropessimism fails to apprehend failure in the racial project of modernity. Institutional meaning is malleable – they forsake relationality for private satisfaction.

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The first is that ‘‘an antiblack world’’ is not identical with ‘‘the world is antiblack.’’ My argument is that such a world is an antiblack racist project. It is not the historical achievement of such. Its limitations emerge from a basic fact. Black people and other opponents of such a project fought, and continue to fight against it. The same argument applies to the argument about social death. Such an achievement would have rendered even those authors’ and the reflections I am offering here stillborn. The basic premises of the antiblack world and social death arguments, are, then locked in performative contradictions. Yet, they have rhetorical force. This is evident through the continued growth of its proponents, literature, and forums devoted to it, in which all lay claim to stillborn status.

In Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, I argued that there are forms of antiblack racism that are also offered under the guise of love. I was writing about whites who exoticize blacks while offering themselves as white sources of black salvation. It was a response to those who regard racism exclusively as acts of demonization. There are also racist forms of valorization. Analyzed in terms of bad faith, where one lies to oneself in an attempt to flee displeasing truths for pleasing falsehoods, exoticists romanticize blacks while affirming white normativity and themselves as principals of reality. These ironic, performative contradictions are features of all forms of racism, where one group is elevated to godlike status and another is pushed below that of human despite both claiming to be human.

Antiblack racism offers whites self-other relations (necessary for ethics) with each other but not so for groups forced in a ‘‘zone of nonbeing’’ below them. Although to be outside is not necessarily to be below, it is so in a system of hierarchy in which above is also interpreted as being within. There is asymmetry where whites and any designated racially superior group stand as others who look downward to those who are not their others or their analogs. Antiblack racism is thus not a problem of blacks being ‘‘others.’’ It’s a problem of their not-being-analogical-selves-and-not-even being-others.

Fanon, in Black Skin, White Masks (1952), reminds us that Blacks among each other live in a world of selves and others. It is in attempted relations with whites under circumstances where whites control the conditions that these problems of dehumanization and subordination occur. Reason in such contexts, as he observes, has a bad habit of walking out when Blacks enter. What are Blacks to do? As reason cannot be forced to recognize Blacks because that would be “violence,” they must ironically reason reasonably with such forms of unreasonable reason. Contradictions loom. Racism is, given these arguments, a project of imposing non-relations as the model of dealing with people designated ‘‘black.’’

In The Damend of the Earth, Fanon goes further and argues that colonialism is an attempt to impose a Manichean structure of contraries instead of a dialectical one of ongoing, human negotiation of contradictions. The former segregates the groups; the latter is produced from interaction. The police, he observes, is the primary mediator between the two models, as their role is the use of force/violence to maintain contraries instead of the human, discursive one of politics and civility requiring the elimination of separation through the interactive, ultimately intimate, dynamics of communication. Such societies draw legitimacy from Black non-existence or invisibility. Black appearance, in other words, would be a violation of those systems. Think of the continued blight of police, extra-judicial killings of blacks and Blacks in those countries. The ongoing model of fascist white rule as the daily condition of blacks is to prevent the emergency of Blacks.

An immediate observation of many postcolonies is that antiblack attitudes, practices, and institutions are not exclusively white. Black antiblack dispositions make this clear. In addition to black antiblackness taking the form of white hatred of black people, there is also the adoption of black exoticism. Where this exists, blacks simultaneously receive black love alongside black rejection of agency. Many problems follow. The absence of agency bars maturation, which would reinforce the racial logic of Blacks as in effect wards of whites. Without agency, ethics, liberation, maturation, politics, and responsibility could not be possible. This is because blacks would not actually be able to do anything outside of the sphere of white approbation and commands.

Afropessimism endorses the previous set of observations, but this agreement is supported by a hidden premise of white agency versus black and Black incapacity. They make much of Fanon’s remark that “the Black has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white.” Fanon’s rhetorical flare led many unfortunate souls to misread this remark. As he had already argued that racism is a socially produced phenomenon, his point was that those who produced it take it to be ontological. In other words, such people – in this case whites – do not take seriously that blacks have any ontological resistance to white points of view. Fanon was not arguing that blacks are ontologically beings, or even nonbeings, of that kind. If this were so, he would not have pointed out, in numerous sections of that book, black and Black experiences with each other. The whole point of the chapter in which that remark is made, “The Lived-Experience of the Black,” is to explore blacks’ and Blacks’ points of view. This is a patent rejection of ontological status while pointing to the presumed ontological status of a skewed perspective.

Proponents of Afropessimism might respond that their position on white agency and black incapacity comes from Fanon’s famous remark that though whites created le Negre – the French term for, depending on the context, “negro,” “nigger,” and “black” – it was les Negres who created Negritude. Whites clearly did not create Afropessimism, which Black liberationists should, in agreement celebrate. We should avoid the fallacy, however, of confusing source with outcome. History is not short of bad ideas from good or well-intentioned people. If intrinsically good, each person of African descent would become ethically and epistemologically a switching of the Manichean contraries, which means only changing players instead of the racist game. We come, then, to the crux of the matter. If the goal of Afropessimism is Afropessimism, its achievement would be attitudinal and, in the language of old, stoic – in short, a symptom of antiblack society.

At this point, there are several observations that follow. The first is a diagnosis of the implications of Afropessimism as symptom. The second examines the epistemological implications of Afropessimism. The third is whether a disposition counts as a political act and, if so, is it sufficient for its avowed aims. There are more, but for the sake of brevity, I’ll simply focus on these.

An ironic dimension of pessimism is that it is the other side of optimism. Oddly enough, both are connected to nihilism, which is, as Nietzsche showed, a decline of values during periods of social decay. It emerges when people no longer want to be responsible for their actions. The same problem surfaces in movements. When one such as the Black Liberation movement is suffering from decay, nihilism is symptomatic. Familiar tropes follow. Optimists expect intervention from beyond. Pessimists declare relief is not forthcoming. Neither takes responsibility for what is valued. The valuing is what leads to the second, epistemic point. The presumption that what is at stake is what can be known to determine what can be done is the problem. If such knowledge were possible, the debate would be about who is reading the evidence correctly. Such judgment would be a priori – that is, prior to events actually unfolding. The future, unlike transcendental conditions such as language, signs, and reality, is ex post facto; ot is yet to come. Facing the future, the question isn’t what will be or how do we know what will be but instead the realization that whatever is done will be that on which the future will depend. Rejecting optimism and pessimism, there is a supervening alternative, as we have seen throughout the reflections offered throughout this book – namely, political commitment.

The appeal to political commitment is not only in stream with what French existentialists call l’intellectuel engage´ (committed intellectual) but also reaches back through the history and existential situation of enslaved, racialized ancestors. Many were, in truth, an existential paradox: commitment to action without guarantees. The slave revolts, micro and macro acts of resistance, escapes, and returns help others do the same, the cultivated instability of plantations and other forms of enslavement, and countless other actions, were waged against a gauntlet of forces designed to eliminate any hope of success. The claim of colonialists and enslavers was that the future belonged to them, not to the enslaved and the indigenous. Such people were, in colonial eyes, incapable of ontological resistance. A result of more than 500 years of conquest and 300 years of enslavement was also a (white) rewriting of history in which African and First Nations’ agency was, at least at the level of scholarship, practically erased. Yet there was resistance even in that realm, as Africana and First Nation intellectual history and scholarship attest; what, after all, are Africana, Black, and Indigenous Studies? What, after all, are those many sites of intellectual production and activism outside of hegemonic academies? Such actions set the course for different kinds of struggle today.

Such reflections occasion meditations on the concept of failure. Afropessimism, the existential critique suggests, suffers from a failure to in their analysis of failure. Consider Fanon’s notion of constructive failure, where what doesn’t initially work transforms conditions for something new to emerge. To understand this argument, one must rethink the philosophical anthropology at the heart of a specific line of Euromodern thought on what it means to be human. Atomistic and individual-substance-based, this model, articulated by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and many others, is of a non-relational being that thinks, acts, and moves along a course in which continued movement depends on not colliding with others. Under that model, the human being is a thing that enters a system that facilitates or obstructs its movement. Under this model, the human being is actually a being. An alternative model, shared by many groups across southern Africa, Asia, South America, and even parts of Continental Europe, is a relational version of the human being as part of a larger system of meaning. Actions, from that perspective, are not about whether ‘‘I’’ succeed but instead about ‘‘our’’ unending story across time. Under this model, no human being is a being simpliciter or being-in-her-or-himself-or-themselves. As relational, it means that each human being is a constant negotiation of ongoing efforts to build relationships with others, which means no one actually enters a situation without establishing new situations of action and meaning. Instead of entering a game, their participation requires a different kind of project – especially where the ‘‘game’’ was premised on their exclusion. Thus, where the system or game repels initial participation, such repulsion is a shift in the grammar of how the system functions, especially its dependence on obsequious subjects. Shifted and shifting energy affords emergence of alternatives. Participation, understood in these terms, is never in games but acts of changing them.

Abstract as this sounds, it has much historical support. For example, Evelyn Simien, in her insightful political study Historic Firsts, examines the new set of relations established by Shirley Chisholm’s and Jesse Jackson’s presidential campaigns. There would have been no President Barack Obama without such important predecessors affecting the demographics of voter participation. Simien intentionally focused on the most mainstream example of political life to illustrate this point. Although no exemplar of radicalism, Obama’s ‘‘success’’ emerged from Chisholm and Jackson’s (and many others’) so-called ‘‘failure.” Despite the appalling reactionary response of a right-wing majority in the 114th Congress during the second term of Obama’s presidency and the election of Donald Trump, whose obsession with erasing Obama’s legacy exemplified a form of psychoanalytical little man’s trauma, the historic fact remains that Obama took the helm of a mismanaged executive branch and gave it a level of dignity and intelligence matched by few of its white exemplars. His successors claim for a restored greatness only reveals the joke that is, in fact, any project on which the term “supremacy” is built: the naked racism and mediocrity that followed – there is an amusing photograph of a Klansman holding up a sign declaring his race’s “superior jeans!” – reveal the folly and terror of white megalomania. Beyond presidential electoral politics, there are numerous examples of how prior, radical so-called ‘‘failures’’ transformed relationships that facilitated other kinds of outcome. The trail goes back to the Haitian Revolution, which offered a vision of Black sovereignty that garnered the full force of Euromodern colonial racial alliances to stall, and back to every act of resistance from Nat Turner’s Rebellion in the USA, Sharpe’s in Jamaica, or Tula’s in Curacao and so many other efforts for social transformation to come.

In existential terms, then, many ancestors of the African diaspora embodied what Søren Kierkegaard (1983) calls an existential paradox. All the evidence around them suggested failure and the futility of hope. They first had to make a movement of infinite resignation – that is, resigning themselves to their situation. Yet they must simultaneously act against that situation. Kierkegaard, as we have seen called this seemingly contradictory phenomenon ‘‘faith,’’ but that concept relates more to a relationship with a transcendent, absolute being, which could only be established by a ‘‘leap,’’ as there are no mediations or bridge to the Absolute whose distant is, as Kierkegaard put it, absolutely absolute. Ironically, if the Afropessimist’s argument rejects transcendental intervention and focused on committed political action, of taking responsibility for a future that offers no guarantees, then the movement from infinite resignation becomes existential political action.

At this point, the crucial meditation would be on politics and political action. An attitude of infinite resignation to the world without the leap of committed action would simply be pessimistic or nihilistic. Similarly, an attitude of hope or optimism about the future would lack infinite resignation. We see here the underlying failure of the two approaches. Yet ironically, there is a form of failure at failing in the pessimistic turn versus the optimistic one, since if focused exclusively on resignation as the goal, then the ‘‘act’’ of resignation would have been achieved, which, paradoxically, would be a success; it would be a successful failing of failure. For politics to emerge, however, there are two missing elements in inward pessimistic resignation to consider.

The first is that politics is a social phenomenon, which means it requires the expanding options of a social world. It must transcend the self. Turning away from the social world, though a statement about politics, is not, however, in and of itself political. As we have seen, The ancients from whom much western political theory or philosophy claimed affinity had a disparaging term for individuals who resigned themselves from political life: idiotes, a private person, one not concerned with public affairs, in a word – an idiot. I mention western political theory because that is the hegemonic intellectual context of Afropessimism; I have not come across Afropessimistic writings on thought outside of that framework. We do not have to end our etymological journey in ancient Greek. Recall that extending our linguistic archaeology back a few thousand years we could examine the Middle Kingdom Egyptian word idi (deaf). The presumption, later taken on by the ancient Athenians and other Greek-speaking peoples, was that a lack of hearing entailed isolation, at least in terms of audio speech. The contemporary inward resignation of seeking a form of purity from the loathsome historical reality of racial oppression, in this reading, retreats ultimately into a form of moralism (private, normative satisfaction) instead of public responsibility born of and borne by action. The nonbeing to which Afropessimist refer is also a form of inaudibility.

The second is the importance of power. Politics makes no sense without it. As we have sene throughout our earlier reflections of power, Eurocentric etymology points to the Latin word potis as its source, from which came the word ‘‘potent’’ as in an omnipotent god. If we again look back further, we will notice the Middle Kingdom (2000 BCE–1700 BCE) KMT/ Egyptian word pHty, which refers to godlike strength. Yet for those ancient Northeast Africans, even the gods’ abilities came from a source: In the Coffin Texts, HqAw or heka activates the ka (sometimes translated as soul, spirit, or, in a word ‘‘magic’’), which makes reality. All this amounts to a straightforward thesis on power as the ability with the means to make things happen.

There is an alchemical quality to power. The human world, premised on symbolic communication, brings many forms of meaning into being, and those new meanings afford relationships that build institutions through a world of culture, a phenomenon that Freud (1989) rightly described as ‘‘a prosthetic god.’’ It is godlike because it addresses what humanity historically sought from the gods – protection from the elements, physical maledictions, and social forms of misery. Such power clearly can be abused. It is where those enabling capacities (empowerment) are pushed to the wayside in the hording of social resources into propping up some people as gods that the legitimating practices of cultural cum political institutions decline and stimulate pessimism and nihilism. The institutions in Abya Yala and in Northern countries, such as the United States and Canada, very rarely attempt to establish positive relations to blacks, and Blacks the subtext of Afropessimism and this entire meditation.

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**Psychoanalysis can’t explain socioeconomically mediated race relations.**

**Hudis, PhD, 15**

(Peter, English/History@Queens, Frantz Fanon: Philosopher of the Barricades)

Fanon’s vantage point upon the world is his situated experience. He is trying to understand the inner psychic life of racism, not provide an account of the structure of **human existence as a whole**. Racism is not, of course, **an integral part of the human psyche**; it is a **social construct that has a psychic impact**. Any effort to comprehend the social distress that accompanies racism by reference to some **a priori structure**—be it the Oedipal Complex or the Collective Unconscious—**is doomed to failure**. Carl Jung sought to deepen and go beyond Freud’s approach by arguing that the subconscious is grounded in a universal layer of the psyche—which he called “the collective unconscious.” This refers to inherited patterns of thought that exist in all human minds, regardless of specific culture or upbringing, and which manifest themselves in dreams, fairy tales, and myths. Jung referred to these universal patterns as “archetypes.” It may seem, on a superficial reading, that Fanon is drawing from Jung, since he discusses how white people tend to unconsciously assimilate views of blacks that are based on negative stereotypes. Even the most “progressive” white tends to think of blacks a certain way (such as “emotional,” “physical,” or “aggressive”), even as they disavow any racist animus on their part. However, Fanon denies that such collective delusions are part of a psychic structure; **they are not permanent features of the mind**. They are habits picked up and acquired from a series of social and cultural impositions. While they constitute a kind a collective unconscious on the part of many white people, they are not grounded in any universal “archetype.” The unconscious prejudices of whites do not derive from genes or nature, nor do they derive from some form independent of culture or upbringing. Fanon contends that Jung “confuses habit with instinct.”21 Fanon objects to Jung’s “collective unconscious” for the same reason that he rejects the notion of a **black ontology**. His phenomenological approach brackets out ontological claims on both a social and psychological level insofar as the examination of race and racism is concerned. He writes, “Neither Freud nor Adler nor even the cosmic Jung took the black man into consideration in the course of his research.”22 This does not mean that Fanon rejects their contributions tout court. He does not deny the existence of the unconscious. He only denies that the inferiority complex of blacks operates on an unconscious level. He does not reject the Oedipal Complex. He only denies that it explains (especially in the West Indies) the proclivity of the black “slave” to mimic the values of the white “master.” And as seen from his positive remarks on Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage, he does not reject the idea of psychic structure. He only denies that it can **substitute for an historical understanding** of the origin of neuroses.23 Fanon adopts a socio-genetic approach to a study of the psyche because that is what is adequate for the object of his analysis. For Fanon, it is the **relationship between** the socio-economic and psychological that is of critical import. He makes it clear, insofar as the subject matter of his study is concerned, that the socio-economic is first of all responsible for affective disorders: “First, economic. Then, internalization or rather epidermalization of this inferiority.”24 Fanon never misses an opportunity to remind us that racism owes its origin to specific economic relations of domination—such as slavery, colonialism, and the effort to coopt sections of the working class into serving the needs of capital. It is hard to mistake the Marxist influence here. It does not follow, however, that what comes first in the order of time has conceptual or strategic priority. The inferiority complex is originally born from economic subjugation, but it takes on a life of its own and expresses itself in terms that surpass the economic. Both sides of the problem—the socio-economic and psychological—must be combatted in tandem: “The black man must wage the struggle on two levels; whereas historically these levels are mutually dependent, any unilateral liberation is flawed, and the worst mistake would be to believe their mutual dependence automatic.”25 On these grounds he argues that the problem of racism cannot be solved on a psychological level. It is not an “individual” problem; it is a social one. But neither can it be solved on a social level that ignores the psychological. It is small wonder that although his name never appears in the book, Fanon was enamored of the work of Wilhelm Reich.26 This important Freudian-Marxist would no doubt feel affinity with Fanon’s comment, “Genuine disalienation will have been achieved only when things, in the most materialist sense, have resumed their rightful place.”27 (35-7)